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RESEARCH REPORT

SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENT

BY AMOR HENRI J.

LETTERS

EXPOSING THE

MISMANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

BY

ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

AND

THE POLITICAL COMBINATIONS

TO

SECURE HIS RE-ELECTION.

BY AMOS KENDALL.

WASHINGTON, D. C.:

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LETTERS.

LETTER 1.

CHANGE OF TONE—POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ABOLITIONISTS—HOW THE FORMER HAVE OUTWITTED THE LATTER—FREMONT—THE NEW YORK M'CLELLAN DEMONSTRATION—LET THE ISSUE BE BETWEEN M'CLELLAN AND FREMONT.

To all American Citizens who long for a speedy restoration of peace, liberty, and the Union:

Before we enter upon the discussion of the management of the war, let us take a brief survey of the present political situation.

A remarkable change has recently come over the organs of the Republican party. The time was when no man could raise his voice against the measures of the President without being stigmatized as a rebel, a copperhead, or a sympathizer. The Administration was declared to be *the Government*, and an unquestioning support of all its measures was considered the test of loyalty. Men were required to support not only all the measures which had been taken, but also all that might be taken for the suppression of the rebellion; and multitudes of patriotic men were tolled into Union Leagues, and there sworn virtually to support those measures, whether they approved of them or not.

How is it now? Even Republicans dare to question the competency of the President to the high duties of his office. Some of them openly condemn his interference with the right of suffrage, his invitation to rebels through the purgation of an oath to become his partners in governing the seceded States, and through them the whole United States, his negro colonies governed by white masters, his suffering himself to be a candidate for reelection in violation of his pledges, &c. And what has become of those rampant "unconditional Union men" who recently denounced every man who whispered dissent from the President's policy, as copperheads or sympathizers? They are as mute as dumb dogs. Men can now speak their minds without danger of denunciation, arrest, and imprisonment.

The truth is, there has long been smothered discontent in the Republican party from its

head in the Cabinet to its tail in the lager beer saloons of the great cities. That party is composed of two distinct elements which I designate *political Abolitionists and religious Abolitionists*. Neither of them has but a single idea: the single idea of the political is the "loaves and fishes"—office and its emoluments; the single idea of the religious is the extinction of slavery. The political Abolitionists care nothing for slavery except as means of gaining and retaining power and would at any time have compounded with the slaveholders upon that condition. They mistook the Southern conspiracy for a mere political game, such as they themselves had been playing, and sincerely believed that all would be compromised in sixty or ninety days. Discovering their mistake in that, they turn their thoughts upon some scheme to *extract political power from the rebellion itself*. Hence the President's scheme of reconstruction, ignoring all honest loyalty in the States redeemed from rebellion and throwing the new governments into the hands of white-washed rebels who will take care to put his own supporters in Congress and the Electoral Colleges. By these expedients and an accession of a dozen votes from new States carved out of the Western wilderness with the population of a third rate Eastern city, it is hoped that the control of the government may, for some time to come, be secured to the *political Abolitionists*.

The *religious Abolitionists*, without being more safe for the country, are more honest in their purposes and more direct in their means. They are the sincere devotees of the "higher law," and deem it perfectly right to trample under foot all human laws and institutions for the purpose of extinguishing negro slavery in the United States. But they have been sadly outwitted and out-managed by their *political allies*. The President, though seeming to vacillate between the two factions, has all along been in the hands of the *political Abolitionists* whose

only hope of perpetuating their political power is centered in his re-election. To prevent their *religious* allies from bringing forward one of their own men, they very adroitly, through the Union Leagues and private correspondence, brought out State Legislatures and other bodies in favor of his re-election, creating a seeming public sentiment designed to forestall the decision of the Republican National Convention. So successfully was the game played, that when the Radicals waked up and began to talk about their man, they found the republican mind preoccupied, and their destined champion deemed it prudent to retire from the field without entering the lists, even for a nomination.

Those of the leading Radicals who are measurably governed by political considerations, seem disposed to acquiesce in the result of this wily management of their associates; but there is effervescence in the popular radical mass which is showing itself in demonstrations in favor of General Fremont.

On the other hand, there are men of many shades of opinion, who think no change of administration can be for the worse, not even the election of General Fremont. There are the Conservatives, embracing in fact a vast majority of the Democratic party, who think the only road to reunion and peace, is through a dispersion of the rebel armies, and an unconditional amnesty to all but the rebel leaders; the peace Democrats, who think the Union can be restored only by a cessation of hostilities and negotiation; the war Democrats who scarcely differ from the Conservatives; and many Republicans who have become disgusted with the management of the war. To all these may be added the real sympathizers with the rebellion in the North, few in number and with little influence.

The recent demonstration in New York, afforded ample evidence, that all these elements are ready to unite in the support of GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, as their candidate for the next Presidency, not because the sympathizers and peace Democrats prefer him to all others, but because, as a choice of evils, they prefer him to the present incumbent. The other classes are prepared to give him a heartfelt and enthusiastic support against all the seductions and threats of the party in power, divided or combined. That the revolutionists appreciate the significance of that meeting may be judged by the virulence and falsehood with which they assail its

proceedings, and the men who took part in them.

And why should not the party in power combine in favor of General Fremont, and join issue with the supporters of General McClellan? Fremont is the true representative of the "higher law" doctrine which would sweep away the "fossilized" Constitution handed down by Washington and his compatriots and give us instead negro "liberty, equality, and fraternity," with a consolidated republic or splendid empire founded on the destruction of the State institutions, and held together by the bayonet. McClellan, on the other hand, is the true representative of the principles of the revolutionary fathers embodied in the Constitution. Fremont would make of the entire South a Hungary or a Poland; McClellan would, when their armies are dispersed, allow them, purified by the fiery ordeal through which they have passed, to resume their position in the Union and govern themselves as heretofore. Let us have this well defined and intelligible issue in preference to the usurping State governments gotten up in the South for the purpose of securing temporary political power, but fraught with dangers of future convulsions and revolutions. *Let us have the glorious old Federal Republic under McClellan, or, whatever God shall vouchsafe us under Fremont.*

AMOS KENDALL.

March 25th, 1864.

LETTER II.

GENERAL GRANT—WILL HE BE ALLOWED TO MANAGE THE WAR?—DOUBTFUL—HIS MANAGEMENT IN TENNESSEE—A GROWL AT HIM—"REFRACTORY" EAST TENNESSEANS WON'T SWEAR—WILL THEIR VOTES BE THROWN OUT?

To all American Citizens who long for a speedy restoration of peace, liberty, and the Union:

It is devoutly hoped that, profiting by past experience, the civil authorities at Washington will hereafter refrain from interfering with the plans of the Lieutenant General commanding our armies. In General Grant, the country has unbounded confidence. The people believe that if supplied with a sufficient force, well fed, well clad, and well paid, and *let alone*, he will, within the present year, take the rebel capital and drive the remnant of the rebel army, now before Richmond, out of Virginia, or disperse it into bands of guerrillas and robbers. Many of

them believe that if he can be permitted to prosecute the war on the Christian principles recommended by General McClellan, and allowed to announce as he advances a general and unconditional amnesty, (excepting only the leaders of the rebellion,) the Southern people will soon lay down their arms, and we shall all rejoice in the restoration of peace and union. But, if absolute conquest and the obliteration of State lines and State rights is to be the ultimate object, and general disfranchisement of the loyal, the constrained and the deluded, as well as the guilty and the deceivers, attended by sweeping confiscations, is to follow in the wake of our armies, then we may despair of a restoration of order in the South for years to come, and may well tremble for the preservation of free institutions as well as individual liberty in the North. It speaks well for Gen. Grant, that he has exacted no degrading oaths from loyal men in Tennessee, and shown a disposition to protect them in their individual and constitutional rights. It also speaks well for him, that he is not trifling away his time in places of amusement and speech-making, while his bleeding country requires all his energies of body and mind to save it from ruin. When we see announcements of our high dignitaries at entertainments and theatres, we cannot but feel that their presence in these times of general mourning and distress would be more appropriate in *houses of prayer*, nor can we avoid thinking of that passage in Roman history which informs us that, "*Nero fiddled while Rome was burning.*"

But we have serious misgivings that Gen. Grant will not be *let alone*. We fear that should he assert his independence and apply his military skill and sound common sense to the suppression of the rebellion with the least possible general suffering and destruction of human life, he will be hunted as Gen. McClellan was by those who, with shouts for liberty, are trampling under foot all the barriers of liberty, and are preparing, ignorantly we hope, both the North and the South for a grand military empire.

We had written thus far, when strong evidence presented itself confirming our fears. We learn through Parson Brownlow's paper, in Knoxville, that in parts of East Tennessee, the people refused to take the oath prescribed by the President's Proconsul or Military Governor, and were allowed to vote notwithstanding. He says, "in several places we have

heard from, where Union sentiment was overwhelming too, the judges and people required and took no oath, but that prescribed by the old code of Tennessee. The people have an idea, somehow or other, that the Union men of East Tennessee, have given sufficient evidence of their loyalty without the additional sanction of a test oath, no matter by what military officer prescribed."

The principal organ of the Revolutionists at Washington, takes to task these "refractory voters" as it calls them, and distinctly intimates that their votes ought not to be counted! It says, "We are not informed whether votes cast in disregard of the Governor's requirement, will be counted, or how many rebel votes were cast on the same easy terms. We presume that Governor Johnson will satisfy himself on these points, and also as to the effect of the example set by these refractory voters, before he permits them to have legal effect."

Why was not the military on hand, as in Kentucky, Maryland, &c., to compel these "refractory voters" to take the oath or drive them from the polls? It was because a man who entertains a high sense of justice and honor was in command of that military district; a man who appreciates the fact, that it is the proper function of the army to *put down the armed rebellion* and not to enforce illegal test oaths upon any body, and especially upon men whose loyalty was never doubted. The article in the revolutionary organ, therefore, can be understood only as a growl at General Grant and an order to Governor Johnson.

And will it not be a scene for the world's wonder, if the votes of these devoted men of Tennessee who have suffered from their loyalty years of horrible robbery and persecution, and seen their neighbors hanged and shot for no crime but fidelity to their government, shall now be thrown out and the government of their State pass into the hands of a parcel of white-washed traitors, the sworn lieges of the Executive at Washington! "Refractory," are they!! Yes, they were too "refractory" to be reduced or driven into rebellion, and they are now too proud and too "refractory" to place themselves on a level with rebels, swear away not only their own property or that of their neighbors, but virtually to give up at executive dictation, the constitutional and legal privileges for which they have so long bled and suffered. And what for? To aid in the consummation of an alliance between

the political abolitionists of the North and the very worst rebels in the South, their own bitterest persecutors, men without principle or honor, who will swear anything to save their property or to gain power, with a view to the re-election of Mr. Lincoln and the permanent government of the whole country by that most unprincipled class of politicians. Already Tennessee and all those States in which the President's plan of reconstruction seems likely to prevail, are considered as mere *Executive appendages*, and in estimates of results their votes are, as a matter of course, put down for Mr. Lincoln.

In my next I propose to commence a review of the management of the war.

AMOS KENDALL.

March 30, 1864.

LETTER III.

A SUMMARY OF THE REASONS WHY THE REBELLION HAS NOT BEEN SUPPRESSED—A GLOOMY PROSPECT.

To all American Citizens who long for a speedy restoration of peace, liberty and the Union.

Why is it, that with an array of military power, an expenditure of treasure and a sacrifice of human life, scarcely equalled in any war of ancient or modern times, the rebellion has not been suppressed and peace restored to our unhappy country? Why is it, that call after call is made for the young men of our land, by hundreds of thousands, to peril health and life in the camp and in the battle field? Why is it, that our National debt is rolling up its immense mass by a thousand millions per annum and taxation bids fair to absorb all the profits of industry? And why the prospect now before us, of indefinite war and bloodshed, increasing debt, increasing taxation, final exhaustion both of men and money, a nation clothed in mourning, agitated with internal throes and sinking at last under a military despotism?

These are solemn inquiries. The answers involve awful responsibilities, and, though truly and boldly, should not be lightly given. In devotion to truth next akin to worship of Deity and devotion to country never surpassed, I shall attempt to answer them.

The cause of the ill success of the Union armies hitherto, may be summed up under the following heads, viz.:

1. *The perfidy of the administration, including Congress, towards the Union men in the*

border and seceded States and the conservative men of the North. All these entered into the support of the war with enthusiasm, because they were assured that it was a war against *rebels* for the Constitution and the Union, and not a war against *States*, for the subversion of their State rights and local institutions. By perfidiously giving it the latter direction in the face of the Constitution, as well as the plighted faith of the President and of Congress, they have quenched whatever of true loyalty was left in the seceded States, alienated the loyal men in the border States, disgusted and measurably discouraged the conservative men of the free States, dividing the North, uniting the South, and doubling the relative strength of the rebellion. The country is now suffering the God-ordained punishment of perfidy by a protracted war with its attendant scenes of desolation, suffering bloodshed and mourning.

2. *Incompetency of those in authority, especially the President of the United States, who, as many of his original friends now admit, has neither the judgment, decision or courage which the crisis of the country requires in its chief magistrate; yet, endowed with a vanity and obstinacy, which, at the same time, make him the victim of flatterers and blind him to the lessons of experience, he is totally unaware that instead of being the idol of the nation, he is supported by intelligent men of his own party merely as a choice of evils.*

3. *The destruction of the safeguards of liberty by the general suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, thus exposing every citizen, loyal as well as disloyal, with cause or without cause, to arbitrary arrest and indefinite imprisonment. This act and the outrages upon personal liberty and the press which have followed, would have produced a revolution among any people less devoted to peace and order and less hopeful of the future than the people of the United States.*

4. *Military jealousy and revolutionary conspiracies, which, operating upon the mind of a weak and timid President, have defeated the best laid military plans, driven some of our ablest Generals from active service, entrusted our armies to incompetent hands, exposed the North to repeated invasions and sacrificed hecatombs of human lives in sickly camps, bootless victories and inglorious defeats.*

5. *The denunciations of a subservient and ferocious press, stigmatizing as Copperheads, sympathizers or traitors, all those who refuse to*

endorse every measure of the Administration adopted under pretext of suppressing the rebellion, though in many instances calculated if not designed to give it strength, and protract the war.

6. *The organization in connection with the Administration of a formidable conspiracy in the North called Union Leagues against the Union and the Constitution, for the preservation of which the people rushed to arms, the members of which are bound by solemn oaths not to disclose their revolutionary plans and to aid and protect each other in carrying them into effect.*

7. *The diversion of portions of the army from the suppression of the rebellion and employing them in the suppression of the freedom of elections in loyal States, not to prevent the election of traitors, but to secure the election of partizans and instruments of the Administration and the Union Leagues, and employing other portions in enabling minorities to prescribe institutions and laws to majorities in States wholly or partially redeemed from rebellion, all evincing a determination of the party in power, if need be, to carry the elections by conspiracy, and force and re-elect their own men at the point of the bayonet.*

8. The gloomy prospect of the future arises not only from the mad policy of the Administration in relation to the rebellion, but from their arrangements to carry the election of President and perpetuate their policy and their power by military force in its direct application in the loyal States, and its indirect application in the seceded States; or, should they fail thus to carry a majority in the electoral colleges in case of a division between Lincoln and Fremont, to make sure of the result in the House of Representatives, where the military-elected Representative of Delaware will not only misrepresent the people of his own State, but vote down the thirty-two true Representatives of New York with her teeming millions. Thus, also a few false Representatives of seceded States, the creatures of military power, and single Representatives of those party creations and executive appendages called new States, carved out of the western wilderness, may come in and vote down the great States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.

Can any man of common understanding shut his eyes to the danger of carrying elections, and especially that of President by such means? Will the millions consent to be governed by the thousands through force and fraud?

The answer to these questions ought to be a warning to those in power to retrace their steps, to confine the war to its legitimate object, the suppression of the armed rebellion, and leave the people of the redeemed as well as the loyal States to the free enjoyment of their natural and constitutional rights and privileges.

In my next letter, I propose to treat more at length upon the perfidy of the Administration, including Congress, towards the truly loyal men, North and South.

AMOS KENDALL.

April 2, 1864.

LETTER IV.

VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONISTS—HAVING GAINED POWER THEY LOOK TO COMPROMISE—DEFEATED BY CO OPERATION OF SECESSIONISTS AND RELIGIOUS ABOLITIONISTS—DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM AND THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONISTS—STATES CANNOT BE REBELS OR PUNISHED AS SUCH—INDIVIDUALS ONLY CAN BE REBELS—PRESIDENT LINCOLN A POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST—HIS INAUGURAL—VIRTUALLY SWEARS THAT HE HAS NO RIGHT, PURPOSE OR INCLINATION TO MEDDLE WITH SLAVERY.

To all American Citizens who long for a speedy restoration of Peace, Liberty, and the Union:

The theme of this and some succeeding letters is the perfidy of the Administration, including Congress, towards the loyal men of the seceded and border States and the conservative men of the North, including more than nineteen-twentieths of the Democratic party.

Immediately after the Presidential election in November, 1860, the southern conspirators openly took measures to bring to an issue the conspiracy they had been about thirty years in concocting. Without a parallel in history of perjury and dishonor, the leaders remained in Congress and the Cabinet for no other purpose than to aid in overthrowing the Government they had sworn to support.

The South Carolina ordinance of secession, was adopted on the 20th of December, 1860. During the months of the succeeding January and February, the example was followed by Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida and Louisiana. They proceeded immediately to form a new Confederacy and adopt a constitution. It was afterwards joined by Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina and Virginia.

The political abolitionists of the North having looked upon the slave question only

as an expedient to gain power, believed that the Southern conspirators were actuated by the same motive, and now that they had lost the game would very readily assent to almost any compromise. Hence they treated the Southern movement very lightly and predicted that all would be quiet in sixty days. Alas! how little did they or the peace Democrats of the North understand or appreciate the terrible earnestness of the Southern leaders! Efforts were made by a peace congress and otherwise to avert the impending calamity, but they were all defeated by the co-operation of two factions acting from far different motives—the rebel leaders of the South and the *religious* abolitionists of the North. The former wanted no adjustment, because their object was, and had been for years, separation and absolute independence; the latter wanted none, because a civil war would enable them to strike at and probably destroy negro slavery in the South. Thus, by the co-operation of extremes, the expectations of *political* abolitionists and the hopes of conservative men were disappointed and our country plunged into a bloody civil war.

When war became inevitable the question arose, on what principle shall it be conducted? Conservative men and the *political* abolitionists maintained, that its only legitimate object was to put down the rebellion and execute the laws of the United States. They looked upon it as a war upon *individuals in rebellion* and not a war upon *States*. States cannot be rebels, though every individual in a State may be, whether he be a private citizen, legislator, judge, or governor. It is the *rebellion of individuals* and not of *States* for which the Constitution and laws of the United States provides a punishment. Indeed, it is a general principle of the Constitution and its chief strength that, in the execution of the United States laws, it wholly ignores the existence of States. No rebel or any other criminal can screen himself from punishment under the plea that he is an officer of a State or committed the crime by its authority. Every law, ordinance, or constitutional provision of a State, purporting to authorize acts in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, is null and void, and can afford no protection to him who pleads them. The rebels in arms are none the less rebels because their States have adopted ordinances of secession, and the governors of those States are none the less traitors because they are governors.

It was believed that if the war should be conducted on these principles, it would be sustained by an united North, would secure the cordial loyalty of the border States and the sympathies and ultimate support of multitudes of loyal men in the seceded States, thus shortening its duration and lessening its calamities. But this constitutional programme did not suit the *religious* abolitionists who had objects in view outside of the Constitution which could not be accomplished without an entire departure from its fundamental principles. They, therefore, were casting about for theories which would enable them to accomplish their object, the Constitution notwithstanding. Hence the idea of *rebel States*, to be punished by the subversion of their constitutions and laws and the destruction of their local institutions.

President Lincoln was, when elected, a *political* Abolitionist. His inaugural address on the 4th of March, 1861, was thoroughly constitutional and conservative. Among other things he said:

• “Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States, that, by the accession of a Republican Administration, their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed, and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches, when I declare that ‘I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists.’ I believe I have no lawful right to do so; and I have no inclination to do so. Those who nominated and elected me, did so with the full knowledge that I had made this, and made many similar declarations, and had never recanted them. And, more than this, they placed in the platform, for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read:

‘Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend; and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.’

“I now reiterate these sentiments; and in doing so I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are to be in

anywise endangered by the now incoming Administration."

Here we have Mr. Lincoln on this most solemn occasion, declaring before men and angels what he conceived to be his duty under the oath he was about to take "faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States" and to the best of his ability "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States." He virtually swore, that he had no right, intention or "purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists," and "that the property, peace and security of no section are to be in anywise endangered by the incoming Administration." And as evidence that the loyal men of the South might implicitly rely on his sincerity, he quotes the platform upon which he was nominated and elected, in which the right of the States "to order and control their own domestic institutions," is declared to be "essential to the balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend," and John Brown raids are denounced as "among the gravest of crimes."

This was the position of the President and his party on the 4th of March, 1861. That it was not changed on the 4th of July, of that year, and for sometime thereafter, I shall show in another letter.

AMOS KENDALL.

April 8, 1864.

P. S.—It is much to be deplored that any American citizen should, under existing circumstances, feel it his duty to raise his voice in favor of *peace with disunion*. It can only give "aid and comfort" to two classes of men, viz: To the enemies of the country in the South, and to the enemies of the Constitution in the North.

The former hail such acts as the harbinger of success in their bloody rebellion. The latter chuckle over them as an argument tending to establish their impudent claim to exclusive unionism and to fix the stigma of disloyalty on all who oppose their unhallowed designs.

If there is any thing which ought to be considered settled in the opinion of the country, it is, that *the rebellion must be suppressed*. There are thousands of men (and I am one of them) who, if the question comes to be, "*Shall the Union be given up, or shall the Administration be sustained, its usurpations and abuses notwithstanding, would decide in*

favor of the latter proposition. Therefore, he who announces himself in favor of *peace with disunion*, is practically, whatever he may think or intend, an effective friend of the rebels and also of the Administration, "giving aid and comfort" to both, and at the same time impairing the power of conservative men to save both the Union and the Constitution.

LETTER V.

RECAPITULATION—THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF JULY 4, 1861—HE REPEATS THE DECLARATIONS OF HIS INAUGURAL AND TELLS HOW THE SOUTH IS TO BE TREATED WHEN THE REBELLION IS SUPPRESSED—PROMISES PROTECTION TO LOYAL CITIZENS EVERY WHERE—CONGRESS RESPONDS TO THE PRESIDENT.

To all American Citizens who long for a speedy restoration of peace, liberty, and the Union:

In our last letter we presented Mr. Lincoln on his inauguration, proclaiming to the people in front of the Capitol, what he considered his solemn duties under the oath he was about to take, "faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States." Then and there, he undertook to define the meaning of the oath in its application to the state of things then existing. Several States had then passed ordinances of secession, had organized a temporary government, and were making military preparations for the purpose of maintaining their independence. Virtually under oath, President Lincoln declared:

"I have no purpose, directly or indirectly to interfere with the institution of slavery in States where it exists.

"I believe I have no lawful right to do so.

"I have no inclination to do so.

"That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment, exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend."

And with the same solemnity he declares:

"I now reiterate these sentiments, and in doing so, I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace and security of no section, are to be in any wise endangered by the incoming administration.

These declarations of the President had no effect in checking the progress of secession. Armies were formed in the South, Fort Sumter was bombarded and captured, Washington itself was in danger, the massacre in Baltimore took place, the President called out first 75,000 and then 300,000 men, and the

North and West were in a flame of patriotic and military ardor.

On the 4th of July, 1861, Congress met in special session at the call of the President. The war had already begun and the President had all the "war power" he has now; yet in his message to Congress he reiterated the sentiments of his Inaugural Address. In that document, he undertook to declare how the States whose people had revolted, would be treated when the rebellion should be suppressed.

"Lest there should be some uneasiness," said he, "in the minds of candid men as to what is to be the course of the Government towards the Southern States after the rebellion shall have been suppressed, the Executive deems it proper to say, it will be his purpose then as ever, to be guided by the Constitution and laws, and that he probably will have no different understanding of the power and duties of the Federal Government relatively to the rights of the States and the people under the Constitution, than that expressed in his inaugural address. He desires to preserve the Government that it may be administered for all, as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal citizens everywhere have a right to claim this of them, and the Government has no right to withhold or neglect it."

In the same message, the President said:

"It may well be questioned whether there is to-day a majority of the legally qualified voters of any State, except perhaps South Carolina, in favor of disunion. There is much reason to believe, that the Union men are the majority in many, if not in every one of the seceded States."

And he concluded his message as follows:

"In full view of his great responsibility, he [President Lincoln] has so far done what he has deemed his duty. You [Congress] will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours. He sincerely hopes that your views and your actions may so accord with his as to assure all faithful citizens who have been disturbed in their rights, of a certain and speedy restoration to them under the Constitution and laws, and having thus chosen our course without guile and with a pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God and go forward without fear and with manly hearts."

Thus spoke President Lincoln to Congress, the country and the world, in July, 1861.

Congress almost unanimously responded to the President by the adoption of the following resolution, viz:

"Resolved, That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon the country by the disunionists of the Southern States, now in arms against the constitutional Government, and in arms around the capital; that in this national emergency Congress, banishing

all feeling of mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country, that this war is not waged on their part in any spirit of oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

This resolution was adopted by a vote of 30 to 5 in the Senate, and by 117 to 2 in the House of Representatives. Upon these assurances, the conservative men of the North, embracing more than nineteen-twentieths of the Democratic party, and the loyal men of the border States, entered with enthusiasm into the war for the Union, while the loyal men of the seceded States stood ready to hail the approach of the Union armies as friends and deliverers.

Where stands the President now? Where is Congress? Has the Constitution changed? Has President Lincoln been absolved from his inaugural oath? Have the members of Congress so far forgotten theirs as to think themselves as omnipotent as a British Parliament? Why is it, that men who stand on the same ground now that the President and Congress did in 1861, are denounced as sympathizers, copperheads or traitors? And why is it that the South is now united and has become desperate, and the North divided and measurably discouraged?

We shall in another letter endeavor to answer these questions.

AMOS KENDALL.

April 11th, 1864.

LETTER VI.

PERFIDY OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS TOWARDS THE DEMOCRATIC AND CONSERVATIVE MASSES OF THE NORTH—TOWARDS LOYAL MEN OF THE BORDER STATES—TOWARDS LOYAL MEN OF THE SECEDED STATES—ITS EFFECTS.

To all American Citizens who long for a speedy restoration of peace, liberty, and the Union:

We have stated that one cause of the failure of the Government to suppress the rebellion is the *perfidy* of the Administration, including Congress, towards the conservative men of the North and the loyal men of the border and seceded States. Let us now consider in what that perfidy consists.

As we have already stated, the conservative and loyal men of the Northern and border States, entered with enthusiasm into the war for the Union upon the solemn assurances of the President and Congress, that the sole object was to enforce the Constitution and laws of the United States throughout their territory and not to interfere with State institutions, much less subvert their constitutions and laws. Yet, within less than fifteen months after the President had reiterated to Congress and the country the declarations of his inaugural address that he had neither the purpose, inclination or "lawful right" to interfere with slavery where it existed, he declared by proclamation his purpose to do so, and on the first of January 1863, proceeded by another proclamation to consummate that purpose. After enumerating certain States and parts of States, he declared as follows: "*I do order and declare, that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free; and that the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons.*"

Having united the North by the declaration that he had no intention and no lawful right to interfere with State institutions, and called for volunteers for the sole purpose of enforcing the Constitution and laws of the United States, it was *perfidy* in the President to demand of those volunteers to aid him in the violation of the very Constitution they had come forward to support. It was *perfidy* towards the Democratic and Conservative men of the North who were no more the friends of slavery than he was, but were little disposed to sustain him in doing what they believed and he had declared he had "no lawful right" to do.

It was *perfidy* to the loyal men in the border States who had saved their States from the vortex of secession by proclaiming to the people the declarations of the President that he had no purpose, inclination or lawful right to interfere with slavery. Afterwards, when Gen. Fremont issued his emancipation order in Missouri and the loyal men of Kentucky, taking the alarm, demanded an explanation of the President, he replied in substance, that Gen. Fremont had been dismissed from his command, and that Kentucky had nothing to fear. Still later, when the President made his proposition for compensated emancipation

to the Representatives of the border States, he told them he considered their slaves as much their property as their cattle, and assured them that as such, their rights should be protected so long as he remained President of the United States. How is it now? Squads of soldiers have been ranging through the States of Maryland and Missouri enticing slaves from their masters, and Kentucky is denounced as little better than a rebel State because she prefers filling up her quotas of troops with white men! Where slaves are taken for soldiers, instead of being paid for at once, their masters are promised only a contingent and inadequate compensation, and it is even proposed to set their women and children free without any compensation. Is there no *perfidy* in all this?

But the most flagrant *perfidy* is that practised towards the loyal men in the seceded States. The President in his inaugural address, not only admitted that he had no right to interfere with their slaves, but in the most positive manner declared, "that the property, peace and security of no section are to be in anywise endangered by the now incoming Administration." And in his message to Congress on the first of July, 1861, the President said: "He desires to preserve the Government that it may be administered for all, as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal citizens every where have the right to claim this of their Government, and the Government has no right to withhold or neglect it."

What do we see now? The Government may have some excuse for not protecting loyal citizens within the rebel lines, but what excuse is there for not conceding to them their admitted rights within the Union lines? Why cannot the Government be administered "as it was administered by the men who made it" in those States, and parts of States, where the rebellion is suppressed? Yet, it is *precisely there* that the President refuses to execute his admitted and sworn duty. With power to protect the loyal citizens in all their constitutional and legal rights, he, by his amnesty proclamation, places them on the footing of notorious rebels and requires them to swear away their property in slaves, if any they have, and, in any event, to purge themselves by oaths from a crime they have never committed or lose their civil rights which they have never forfeited! Is there not *perfidy* of the deepest dye in all this?

A majority of Congress has not been behind

the Executive in falsified promises and acts of perfidy. Did they not resolve in 1861, almost unanimously, that this war is not waged "for any purpose of subjugation or purpose of overthrowing or of interfering with the rights or established institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality and rights of the several States unimpaired?" What do we see now? Wherever the Federal arms prevail, the power acquired is used not only to overthrow "established institutions," but to subvert State Constitutions and laws, strip them of their "dignity, equality and rights" and reduce their inhabitants, whether loyal or disloyal, to the condition of a conquered people with no property or rights except such as the President chooses to vouchsafe to them! And this utter reversal of the rightful and only constitutional object of the war, is not only approved and sustained by a subservient Congress; but its leaders tell us that loyalty to "the Constitution as it is and the Union as it was," is a crime!

Is it to be wondered at, that Democrats and Conservative men of the North, who entered with enthusiasm into the war for the Union which our fathers bequeathed to us, should feel their ardor cool a little when called upon to fight for a new and untried Union to be called into being from the chaos of a bloody revolution? Is it to be wondered at, that those who looked upon the States in their constitutional relations, as the pillars of our temple of liberty, should look with alarm upon their overthrow and begin to tremble for the entire structure? Is it surprising when revolution, and not the preservation of our constitutional Union, is the present object of the Administration and of Congress, that all patriotic volunteering has ceased and our armies are fast becoming bands of black janizaries and white mercenaries—the latter hired at prices heretofore unknown in the annals of war? Is it wonderful, after the border States have been so shamefully deceived and betrayed, that their loyalty has become a mere choice of evils, their inhabitants preferring to be robbed in the Union to being butchered in the Southern Confederacy? And what is the condition of the loyal men in the seceded States? Persecuted for their devotion to the Constitution, jeered at by their rebel neighbors as the dupes of President Lincoln and his Congress, every hope dashed by their perfidy, insulted and robbed by the

Government which promised them protection, they have taken shelter in the rebel ranks or sunk down in mute despair.

If Jefferson Davis himself had been allowed to dictate the policy of our Government, it could not have been better adapted to divide the North, alienate the border States, unite the people of the South, and make them fight with the energy of despair.

The process by which affairs have been manipulated into their present condition, will form the theme of another letter.

AMOS KENDALL.

April 18th, 1864.

LETTER VII.

M'CLELLAN AND GRANT—WHY M'CLELLAN DID NOT TAKE RICHMOND IN 1862—THE CONSEQUENCES.

To every American Citizen who longs for a speedy restoration of peace, liberty, and the Union:

The writer of these letters has been too much interested in the tragic scenes which have illustrated the last two weeks to pursue his unwelcome theme, and doubtless his readers have been as little inclined to read as he to write. Instead of at present following his proposed order of discussion, let us consider passing scenes in their relation to the past.

In 1862 when Gen. McClellan was before Richmond with the army of the Potomac, there were five Major Generals in the State of Virginia with separate commands, viz: McClellan before Richmond, Wool at Fortress Monroe, McDowell at Fredericksburg, Banks in the Shenandoah Valley and Fremont in Western Virginia. The President himself and Secretary of War gave orders direct to each of these generals, constantly interfering with their plans, and especially those of Gen. McClellan. The number and description of troops necessary, in that General's opinion, for the capture of Richmond, had been definitely fixed upon apparently with their approval. But when he was about to start, the President took from him 10,000 men of those troops, Blenker's Division, for the purpose of increasing the command of Gen. Fremont. Before he left Washington he had been authorized to draw 10,000 men from Fortress Monroe to aid him in his enterprize. The day after his arrival at that post, that authority was withdrawn

from him. Thus, before he advanced upon Richmond, he was deprived of 20,000 men of his contemplated force.

Gen. McClellan believed that with the aid of McDowell's Corps of 35,000 men, he was still strong enough to take the rebel capital. He fought his way to its very gates and McDowell was on the point of joining him, when he too was ordered upon other service and the *rebel capital was saved!*

Now, who can doubt that if McClellan had been allowed to retain these 55,000 men, and to manage the campaign in his own way, even without the power to order reinforcements which Grant now possesses, *Richmond would then have been taken* and the rebellion driven further South, perhaps entirely suppressed? Who then is responsible for the subsequent calamities and the indefinite prolongation of the war? Who is responsible for the awful consequences of thus depriving McClellan of the force deemed by him necessary for the capture of Richmond? Who is responsible—

For the blood of Malvern Hill and other fields during McClellan's retirement to Harrison's Landing?

For the blood of the second defeat at Bull Run?

For the blood of Antietam?

For the blood of Fredericksburg?

For the blood of Chancellorsville?

For the blood of Gettysburg?

For the blood that is now flowing in rivers between Fredericksburg and Richmond?

Yes, who shall answer for all this carnage when God "maketh inquisition for blood?" Not, surely, General McClellan, who would have prevented it, *had he been let alone!* And the joy that now animates every loyal heart on hearing the sounds of victory from the Army of the Potomac, is saddened by the reflection that the blood which it costs is a sacrifice made necessary by military and political jealousy, now intensified into personal hatred which apparently would rather see the Union perish than that General McClellan should, in a subordinate command, aid General Grant in saving it!

AMOS KENDALL.

May 20, 1864.

LETTER VIII.

MILITARY SUCCESS IN 1862—ABOLITIONISTS FOR
DISUNION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SLAVE

EMPIRE—PREVENTED BY LOYAL DEMOCRATS,
&c.—DISAPPOINTED IN THEIR DISUNION AND
PRO-SLAVERY SCHEME, THEY SEEK TO EXTIN-
GUISH SLAVERY IN BLOOD—THEY ARE THE BEST
FRIENDS OF THE REBELS.

*To all American Citizens who long for a speedy
restoration of peace, liberty and the Union.*

In our No. 6, we proposed to show in a subsequent letter, how the affairs of the country have been manipulated into their present condition. How is it, why is it and by whom has the President been induced to do what he declared in March and July, 1861, he had "no lawful right to do?"

In the winter and spring of 1861-2 our military affairs were progressing gloriously upon the programme laid down by Congress and the President. The rebels had been driven out of Western Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri, Forts Henry and Donelson, Roanoke Island and several cities of North Carolina, Nashville, Tenn., Island No. 10 in the Mississippi river, Fort Pulaski in the Savannah river, New Orleans with its defences, Huntsville, Ala., and Norfolk, Va., with many other places in rebel hands, had been captured and occupied by the Federal armies. The bloody battle of Shiloh had been fought and won, and General McClellan was advancing upon Richmond with every prospect of success. The country was full of joy for victories won and of confidence that the rebellion was soon to be crushed.

Unhappily for our country, there was a faction in the North who were resolved that either *the Union or African slavery should perish!* Of the two, they were at first inclined to *aid the southern conspirators in breaking up the Union.* Their ultra leaders had long been openly opposed to the Constitution, which they denounced as "*a covenant with death and a league with hell.*"

The leading newspaper organ of the radical Abolitionists, is the *New York Tribune.* The following passages are extracted from that paper of November and December, 1860, and February, 1861, viz:

"We must ever resist the right of any State to remain in the Union and nullify or defy the laws thereof. To withdraw from the Union, is quite another matter; and *whenever a considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep it in.* We hope never to live in a Republic whereof one section is pinned to another by bayonets."

* * * * *
"If the cotton States unitedly and earnestly wish to withdraw peacefully from the Union,

we think they should and would be allowed to do so. Any attempt to compel them by force to remain, would be contrary to the principles enunciated in the immortal declaration of independence, contrary to the fundamental ideas on which human liberty is based."

* * * * *

"Whenever it shall be clear that the great body of the Southern people have become conclusively alienated from the Union, and anxious to escape from it, *we will do our best to forward their views.*" In the same article the *Tribune* said, "*if the slave States, the cotton States or the Gulf States, choose to form an independent nation, they have a clear moral right to do so.*"

Wendell Phillips, one of the principal abolition apostles, commenced a speech in Boston in April, 1861, with the following words, viz:

"Many times this winter, here and elsewhere, I have counselled peace—urged as well as I knew how, *the expediency of acknowledging a Southern Confederacy and the peaceful separation of these thirty four States.*"

In the same speech, he made the following declaration, viz:

"*This war means one of two things—EMANCIPATION OR DISUNION.*"

In a speech made in Washington by the same man, in March, 1862, he said: "*I have labored nineteen years to take nineteen States out of this Union, and if I have spent any nineteen years to the satisfaction of my Puritan conscience, it was those nineteen years.*"

It is unnecessary to multiply proofs that, on the breaking out of the rebellion, the leaders of the *religious abolitionists* (the men *whose only religion is negro emancipation*) so far from desiring the abolition of slavery, were in favor of giving up the Union and *letting the slaveholders have their own way!* They had their representative in Mr. Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury, who declared to the Mayor of Baltimore and others, in the spring of 1861, that if the Southern States desired to leave the Union he was in favor of letting them "*go in peace.*" Of this declaration the President was not ignorant.

Why have these men changed their ground and become most rampant "*unconditional Union men,*" (always with the *condition*, however, that slavery shall be abolished,) denouncing all who think as they did at the outset, or will not subscribe to their new creed, as sympathizers or traitors? The true answer to this question is the fact that the President, the *political abolitionists*, and nineteen-twentieths of the Democratic party were determined that *the Federal Union shall be preserved.* Finding themselves unable to *perpetu-*

ate slavery by aiding in the establishment in the South of an *empire founded on slavery*, they determined if possible to force the Government to pervert the war from a war for the Union to a war against slavery, reckless of the *hetacombs* of Northern lives and the thousands of millions of Northern money which such a vindictive contest might cost, as well as of the danger that not only the Union but the white man's liberty might perish in the desperate struggle. What if the Union did perish in the terrible ordeal? It would be but the realization through seas of blood of the end which they had desired peacefully to accomplish.

Their policy now was to drive the President from the loyal position which he occupied, and expel from command in the army, and if possible from the cabinet, every man of conservative views, and convert the army and the administration into a vast abolition combination, the *main* object of which should be, *not the preservation of the Union, but the extinction of slavery.* All must remember the efforts made to compel the President to dismiss one or more members of his cabinet for no other reason than that they revolted against the revolutionary doctrines of these new converts to Unionism, nor can the slanders against our ablest generals for the same and no other reason be forgotten.

Conservative men hoped that the President had firmness enough to resist the diabolical pressure brought to bear upon him, not because they wished to preserve slavery from the legitimate ruin sure to overtake it in the progress of the Union armies, should the rebels persist in their crime, but because they plainly saw that to make the extinction of slavery the avowed object of the war, would divide the North, unite the South, protract the war indefinitely and render it incalculably more vindictive, expensive and bloody. Their efforts were, therefore, directed to strengthening the hands of the President and enable him to bear up against the northern enemies of the Union.

During all the agitation preceding and attending secession, the southern conspirators considered the northern abolitionists as their best friends. Gov. Adams of South Carolina said of them:—

"The abolitionists are our best friends. Thank God for what they have already done; and for the inestimable blessing they were about to confer, they were entitled to our

warmest gratitude. Their assaults have been unceasing, but all for our good. They have furnished us a justification for dissolving our connection with them."

Yes, in three particulars, the Northern Abolitionists were the best friends of the Southern conspirators:

First, by furnishing them with means to excite the Southern masses into rebellion.

Secondly, by advocating the policy of "letting them go in peace," and thus aiding them to establish "an empire founded on slavery."

Thirdly, by pushing the government into an extreme policy of emancipation and confiscation, uniting the South, dividing the North, and in effect doubling the relative strength of the rebellion.

And should it be found after the shedding of oceans of blood, that the *subjugation* of the South is impossible, these men will return to their first love and become clamorous for peace and disunion. *Peace and Union* without subjugation, is the last thing they aim at or desire.

How the President came to be made the instrument of these Northern conspirators will be shown in another letter.

AMOS KENDALL.

June 6th, 1864.

LETTER IX.

HOW PRESIDENT LINCOLN WAS LED TO ADOPT THE BLOODY POLICY OF THE RELIGIOUS ABOLITIONISTS.

To all American Citizens who long for a speedy restoration of peace, liberty and the Union.

In our last letter we showed that the radical abolitionists were in favor of the establishment of a Southern Empire, founded on slavery, in preference to any attempt to preserve the Union by force, and when they could not accomplish that object, came into the support of the war, not to save the Union, but as a means of extinguishing the very institution they at first sought to perpetuate. How President Lincoln was made the despised instrument of this revolutionary faction, we shall now attempt to show.

The inaugural address of the President and his message of July, 1861, were thoroughly constitutional and loyal.

When in August 1861, General Fremont, without a particle of authority, issued his con-

fiscation and emancipation proclamation in Missouri, the President gently rebuked him and relieved him from his command. When in December, 1861, General Phelps in Louisiana, also without authority, issued a more extravagant proclamation, the President disapproved of it and relieved him also from his command. In May, 1862, General Hunter in South Carolina, issued his unauthorized and ridiculous proclamation declaring free all the slaves in his Military Department, composed of the States of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida. This also, was disapproved by the President, and General Hunter was relieved of his command.

All truly loyal men approved these acts of the President, although they could not help wondering that all the military commanders had not been instructed to conform all their orders and proclamations to the resolves of Congress and his own declarations touching the objects of the war. They could not but look upon the course of Fremont, Phelps and Hunter, as most damaging to the Union cause, by furnishing arguments to the southern conspirators tending to confirm to their people the declarations they had made touching the designs of the North, and at the same time creating distrust and alarm among loyal men every where. In this view, not only the Democratic and Conservative parties, but the *political* Abolition press every where, approved and applauded the course of the President in adhering to the policy announced at the commencement of the war and countermanding the illegal orders of his officious Generals.

But the Northern conspirators, to whom constitutions and laws are cobwebs, and oaths and pledges only taken or made to be broken at convenience, were not content that the President should maintain the faith which he pledged to all loyal men everywhere in his inaugural, and carry out the policy prescribed by Congress. The *New York Tribune*, in anticipation, contained the following announcement: viz.,

"It is currently reported that the President is to be constrained by the pressure of Border State and Democratic hostility to annul or seriously modify Gen. Hunter's order, perhaps, even to deprive the General of his command. * * But, bear in mind, *that he will do this, if at all, for the sake of Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, &c., not because he deems it the true way to recover Georgia to the Union.* It is Northern and Border State con-

servatism, so called, not the exigencies of the struggle in the rebel States, that overbears Gen. Hunter, and compels him to fight treason with gloves."

No credit is given to the President for his observance, in this matter, of the public faith pledged by himself and Congress to the whole country, and, especially, to the loyal men of the Border and Southern States, nor even to his own consistency in relation to his constitutional powers and obligations; but he is supposed to act wholly under party, local and hostile influences. This was very natural in the *Tribune*. In Boston a public meeting was held, after the issue of the President's Proclamation annulling Gen. Hunter's order, at which a resolution offered by Wm. Lloyd Garrison was adopted, declaring "that, in swiftly revoking the decrees of General Fremont and General Hunter, President Lincoln has twice officially interposed, with whatever honesty of purpose, in the most direct manner, so as to give fresh zeal and encouragement to the traitors who are banded together for the overthrow of the Government," &c., &c.

On that occasion Wendell Phillips made a speech, in which he said, "The President, with servile, lickspittle haste, runs, before he is bidden, to revoke the Hunter proclamation. * * It showed the old proslavery leaning of the Government. He believed that President Lincoln's decree, in relation to Gen. Hunter's proclamation, had lost a quarter of the chances of preserving the Union. What were the anti-slavery people to do now? They must educate public opinion, that was all, and force the Government up to the proper anti-slavery point. * * The President and Cabinet of the United States were treasonable in their delay," &c., &c.

In March, 1862, the President in a message to Congress had recommended that provision should be made to pay for all the slaves which might be emancipated in any State which might adopt a system of gradual emancipation. Although Congress adopted a resolution approving the policy, they made no provision to render it effective. Practical men generally looked upon the scheme as utterly visionary and regretted its announcement because it was calculated to distract the public mind from the great paramount object, the suppression of the rebellion.

In July, 1862, the President in a written

address, urged the representatives of the Border States in Congress to press his scheme upon their people, at the same time assuring them verbally that their slave property should be protected while he remained President. In that address, he very distinctly indicated the sources of the influences under which he was acting, in the following words, viz: "Gen. Hunter is an honest man. * * He proclaimed all men free within certain States and I repudiated the proclamation. * * * Yet, in repudiating it, I gave dissatisfaction if not offence, to many whose support the country cannot afford to lose. And this is not the end of it. The pressure in this direction is still upon me and is increasing. By conceding what I now ask, you can relieve me, and what is more, can relieve the country in this important point."

History will think it remarkable that Mr. Lincoln did not, in this instance, appeal for relief to those who were making the pressure, Greeley, Garrison, Phillips, and their co-conspirators, instead of going to the representatives of the Border States who were performing all their constitutional obligations. The former wanted him to do what he had declared he had no lawful right to, and to satisfy their unreasonable and insolent demands, he asks that the people of the Border States shall relinquish a clear constitutional right, and give up their slave property without any provision for their indemnification. As might have been expected, the movement was a total failure.

Congress passed an act declaring that all slaves of rebels, coming within the control of the Union armies, should be thenceforth free, and added the following section: viz.,

"That the President of the United States is authorized to employ as many persons of African descent, as he may deem necessary and proper for the suppression of this rebellion, and for this purpose he may organize and use them in such manner as he may judge best for the public welfare."

In pursuance of this act, the Secretary of War, by order of the President, issued a general order containing the following provision: viz.,

"That military and naval commanders shall employ as laborers within and from said (seceded) States, so many persons of African descent as can be advantageously used for military and naval purposes, giving them reasonable wages for their labor."

This order called forth a general growl of dissatisfaction from all the organs of the northern conspirators. The following brief extracts will show their temper. The New York *Tribune* said:

"If this is all that is to be done by the Government in obedience to the confiscation emancipation act, then the Union cause will have been fatally wounded in the house of its friends. No equivocating, higgling, hairsplitting, hangback policy will now save it. Unless the slaves are given to understand, and that speedily, that the Union wants their services enough to give them liberty therefor, then the rebellion can never be put down. * We speak plainly; for in this crisis it were treason to be silent or ambiguous."

The article concludes as follows, viz:

"Of course, we do not know that the President will stop here. We trust he will not. Yet the appearance of this order would seem to indicate that nothing further is contemplated. If that be the fact, we sadly feel that the nation is undone."

The New York *Evening Post* also contained a censorious article concluding as follows:

"But the electric words are wanting. The glorious name of Freedom, which is the solution of the whole difficulty, does not appear on the record. In this the President has not come up to the requirements of the law."

The New York *Independent* irreverently undertook to interpret the will of God, and spoke as follows: "We believe that *God gives us a last chance*. He has coupled our revolution with humiliation. We must accept our own nationality at the price of the African freedom. Both sides in this conflict must ask the negro to help them. Which side he takes, that side God takes."

The infidel and fanatic press everywhere kept up an incessant assault upon the President for the purpose of driving him from the loyal position he occupied, and finally Horace Greely, in the name of "twenty millions of freemen," addressed him a letter taking him to task for his delinquencies and telling him what to do. In this letter he arraigned the President thus, viz:

"We think you are strangely and disastrously remiss in the discharge of your official and imperative duty with regard to the emancipation provisions of the new confiscation act."

He not only assailed the President for present delinquency, but arraigned him for unfaithfulness in his inaugural address. He said:

"We complain that the Union cause

has suffered and is suffering immensely from mistaken deference to rebel slavery. Had you, sir, in your inaugural address unmistakably given notice that in case the rebellion already commenced were persisted in, and your efforts to preserve the Union and enforce the laws should be resisted by armed force, you would recognize no loyal person as rightfully held in slavery by a traitor, we believe the rebellion would therein have received a staggering if not a fatal blow."

This retrospective censure came from one who at the time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, publicly avowed his desire to give up the Union and allow the rebels peacefully to establish their empire founded on slavery.

The President deigned to answer this impertinent address in a short letter of much force, although it contained an implication that he might exercise unlimited power if he thought it necessary for the restoration of the Union.

The clamor for an emancipation proclamation continued and increased, accompanied by demands for the dismissal from the Cabinet and from command in the army of all who were not in favor of the radical policy. Finally, a delegation of clergymen came all the way from Chicago, to instruct the President, not in regard to his constitutional duties, but to tell him what the will of God was, and urge him to issue a proclamation declaring the slaves free in the seceded States. Instead of telling them he had no constitutional or legal right to interfere with slavery in the States; that he had taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution, and the will of God was that he should keep that oath inviolate, he entered into a parley with them, during which he clearly indicated his opinion that such a proclamation would, on the whole, do no good, while he virtually claimed unrestricted power to take that step or any other deemed by him a necessary war measure, the Constitution notwithstanding. He said, "understand, I raise no objection against it on legal or constitutional grounds, for as commander-in-chief of the army and navy in time of war, I suppose I have a right to take any measures which may best subdue the enemy." This doctrine abolishes Constitution and law in time of war and converts our government into an absolute monarchy! And such seems to be its character now in the estimation of Mr. Lincoln and his supporters. Indeed, his emancipation proclamation which

followed but a very few days after his interview with these *wise men of the West*, can be vindicated on no other ground. It purported to abolish a State institution protected by the Constitution of the United States, and hence was a palpable violation of that Constitution. Neither had it the color of sanction in any act of Congress. Their act only declared free the slaves of rebels who came within Federal control. This proclamation declared free all slaves in certain States whether their masters were rebel or loyal, or whether within Federal control or not. It rests for its justification solely on the assumption of the President that he has "*a right to take any measures,*" legal or illegal, constitutional or unconstitutional, "*which may best subdue the enemy.*" Yet, what could more effectually unite and strengthen the enemy and divide and weaken the friends of the Union, than such assumptions of power as this?

Thus it was, that President Lincoln was partly coaxed and partly driven by a contemptible faction, composed in part of unreasoning fanatics and in part of unprincipled demagogues, from the loyal position assumed by him in his Inaugural Address and his first message, perfidiously betraying the loyal men of the border and seceded States, alarming the friends of a constitutional Union everywhere, and entailing upon his country years of exterminating war and ages of grinding taxation.

There are other views of that important crisis which must form the topics of another letter.

AMOS KENDALL.

JULY 6th, 1864.

LETTER X.

ABOLITIONISTS THE ONLY DISLOYAL PARTY IN THE NORTH—LED BY INFIDELS AND FANATICAL CLERGYMEN—THE INFIDELS ONLY OBJECT IS POWER—THEY SOUGHT IT FIRST BY DIVIDING THE UNION THAT THEY MIGHT GOVERN A SECTION—AND THEN BY ABOLISHING SLAVERY THAT THEY MIGHT GOVERN THE WHOLE—HOW THE PRESIDENT CHEATED THEM—HIS PERFDY TO THE TRULY LOYAL.

To all American citizens who long for a speedy restoration of peace, liberty, and our Union:

To appreciate the fatal error committed by Mr. Lincoln when he yielded to the pressure of the radical abolitionists, we must consider what was then the condition of parties in the North and what their impelling motives.

The Democratic party of the North almost to a man was and is devoted to the Union upon the principles of the Constitution, and with very few exceptions, was ready to sustain any administration in defending it.

Three-fourths of the Republican party were also faithful to the Constitution as it is. Their leaders had assumed abolition sentiments to gain power, and having gained it, would to save the Union, very gladly have compromised with the Southern conspirators whom they strangely believed to be, like themselves, playing a mere political game.

The only disloyal party in the North, was the radical abolitionists. It was and still is constituted of these factions—one faction composed of infidels led by Greeley, Phillips and men of that stamp, who scoff at religion and rail at established institutions; the other composed of religious men led by bigoted clergymen, who in their presumption deny the truths of their own Bible which they teach others to regard as Divine, and instead of the gospel of love and peace, teach a new gospel of hatred, robbery and murder. The Devil never works so successfully as when he is enabled to put on the clerical robe, and when I hear preachers address their impious prayers to the God of the Bible imputing as a national sin—an institution which that God sanctioned among his chosen people, I cannot but think that their own blindness and uncharitableness is one of the real sins for which the nation is scourged. But they are sincere and terribly in earnest.

But the infidel Abolitionists, the Greeley and Phillips faction, never were sincere or in earnest for the emancipation of the slaves. Like their brethren, the political Abolitionists, *political power* was their impelling motive. They merely outran their competitors, and, by keeping ahead, hoped to monopolize the honors and emoluments of the Government. Why, when the rebellion was brewing, were they willing to let the slaveholders "go in peace," instead of fighting for the Union? *Simply because they supposed that, having gotten rid of the slaveholding States, they would govern the balance.* Why, when swept along into the support of the war for the Union by an overwhelming torrent of patriotic enthusiasm, did they at once set about diverting it from its legitimate object, to a war against slavery? *Simply because they flattered themselves that, if slavery were abolished, they would govern the whole Union.* POLITICAL

POWER and its emoluments was their sole aim from first to last. If that could be obtained by a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of an empire founded on slavery, it was all very well; *that was their first choice.* When they found that impossible, then they aimed at the same end through the overthrow of the Constitution, the subversion of State governments, the extermination of the white population in the South, and a military despotism over the whole Union.

Why was not this infidel faction satisfied when President Lincoln apparently seated himself upon their platform? Because their object was not attained; the President *did not give them the offices*; Mordecai was still sitting at the King's gate; *Seward was in the Cabinet.* The President had not, after all, conceded the *only portion* of their demands which they deemed of any importance. What the demands not conceded were may be learned in the following extracts from one of Wendell Phillip's tirades, viz:

"Radical men ask of the President an emancipation proclamation declaring all slaves freemen. Of what use would such a proclamation be if Halleck and McClellan in the field and Blair and Seward in the Cabinet, are left to execute it? It would not be worth the paper it wasted. * * If the President should proclaim emancipation and Halleck and McClellan and Buell smother under pretence of executing the measure, it will be a failure. Let us provide beforehand against such a danger. Let it be understood now that our claim of the government is—satisfy yourselves fully that your conciliation policy has failed, and then we demand a proclamation of freedom, war on war principles, to be conducted by such men as Sumner, of Massachusetts, Stevens, of Pennsylvania, and Wade, of Ohio, and their friends in the Cabinet and by Hunter, Sigel and Fremont in the field. Let thinking men solemnly impress it on the nation, that no matter how high in office or how wide the rule reaches, *no emancipation policy is of any value unless its earnest and down-right friends are put at the head of affairs.*"

The President gave to these infidel abolition conspirators "the proclamation of freedom," which was esteemed by them of *no value* because he did not put them "at the head of affairs."

But why did President Lincoln yield to this insolent pressure at all? On the platform of the Constitution and a war in its defence, he was sustained by more than three fourths of the people in the loyal States, and had the sympathy of multitudes in the seceded States. Why would he descend from the honorable,

honest and loyal position then occupied by him to conciliate a miserable faction of infidels and fanatics, the former too selfish to be patriotic and the latter too bigoted to reason? Had the country anything to gain by alarming thinking men of the North for constitutional liberty and uniting all men in the South in a war of desperation? Unhappily for their country and themselves, the minds of President Lincoln and his most trusted advisers, were incapable of rising to the dignity of the occasion. The *unity of their party* was deemed more desirable than the Union of all really loyal men of all parties. The loyal Democrats were lost right of altogether. The President, not only yielded to the Radicals the proclamation of freedom, but sacrificed to their clamor McClellan and Buell, because they were Democrats. In these acts it was hoped he had done enough to satisfy those fanatics who had no personal aspirations, and that the ambitious and unprincipled infidels would be left with no party but the Red Republican Germans. As a party movement, designed to secure the re-election of Mr. Lincoln and the ascendancy of the political Abolitionists over the Radicals, this was a very adroit proceeding; but what shall we say of its effect upon the progress of the war and the interests of the country? The desperation it has produced in the South and distrust and dissatisfaction in the North, have so strengthened the rebel armies and weakened those of the Union, that after the sacrifice of myriads of lives with no beneficial result, *your capital is now besieged and many resolute men begin to despair of final success.* Such is a portion of the bitter fruits the country is reaping from the perfidy of the President towards the loyal men of the border and seceded States, and the loyal Democrats of the North. What but disaster can be expected to follow perfidy?

Yet, Mr. Lincoln expects the people to re-elect him to end the war!

AMOS KENDALL.

July 12th, 1864.

LETTER XI.

GENERAL M'CLELLAN DRIVES THE REBELS OUT OF WESTERN VIRGINIA—IS CALLED TO WASHINGTON—APPOINTED GENERAL-IN-CHIEF—CREATES THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—ENCOUNTERS SINISTER INFLUENCES—THE PRESIDENT'S DISCOURTEOUS INTERFERENCES AND CHILDISH ORDERS—BE-

LIEVES M'CLELLAN OF THE COMMAND IN CHIEF AND ASSUMES IT HIMSELF—M'CLELLAN'S UNPARDONABLE SIN—IS DEPRIVED OF 20,000 MEN OF HIS COMMAND—SIX GENERALS COMMANDING IN VIRGINIA.

To every just and patriotic man :

We now come to the consideration of a passage in the history of our great civil war which will strike future generations with wonder and amazement as it now fills every truly loyal bosom with grief and indignation. It is the outrage committed upon the country through the treatment inflicted by the present Administration on the army of the Potomac and its gallant leader, General George B. McClellan.

When the rebellion broke out, General McClellan was in private life. He was a Democrat, and like most of his party, resolved to support the Administration with all his powers in their attempts to preserve the Union. On the 23d of April 1861, he was appointed by the Governor of Ohio, Major General of the Ohio three months men, and on the third of May he was entrusted by General Scott with the command of a Department composed of the States of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. These States were badly supplied with arms and almost destitute of military organization. Gen. McClellan, with the cordial co-operation of the Governors of the three States, soon brought order out of chaos, and in a short campaign, made up of masterly combinations and brilliant actions, cleared all of Western Virginia north of the Great Kanawha, of the rebel hordes. In the midst of his victorious career, he was directed to turn over that command to General Rosecrans and assume the command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington. In October 1861, he was appointed General-in-chief of the armies of the United States in place of the aged soldier and patriot, General Winfield Scott, who was placed on the retired list at his own request.

Prior to his transfer to Washington, the first battle of Bull Run had been fought and lost, and military affairs in and about that city were in a most confused and disorderly condition. With a zeal and devotedness never surpassed, the young soldier and patriot set himself about devising a plan for the future campaign, and organizing armies to carry them into effect. Admonished by the disaster of Bull Run which had inspired the rebels with increased confidence, he determined not to put men in the field until they should be in some degree trained to arms, and well sup-

plied with all the appliances of war. With unceasing labor and indomitable energy, he devoted himself to the organization, discipline and arming of the myriads of men which the country was pouring forth for the salvation of the Union, and in the spring of 1862, had created one of the most magnificent armies ever marshalled in the field. He had also arranged, as General-in-chief, a system of combined operations for all the armies of the United States, designed to crush rebellion in a single year, or at least drive it far into the South.

Unfortunately for the country, Gen. McClellan had three sinister influences to encounter, which, in the end, defeated all his grand schemes for the suppression of the rebellion, and have already cost two hundred thousand northern lives, thousands of millions of northern money, and entailed upon the country a war of desperation, the end of which the wisest cannot foresee.

First. He was a Democrat, and at the threshold encountered the prejudices and hostility of the Republican leaders, who were incapable of appreciating talents and patriotism, not of their own party. He soon gained without an effort, other than the faithful discharge of every patriotic duty, the confidence and esteem of his own party, and though he could not help it if he would, it was imputed to him by the official paper in Washington as an unpardonable offence, that he had "*suffered himself to be made the idol of a party!*" It was feared, that if allowed to execute his gigantic plans, he would soon put down the rebellion and become the *idol of the country!* What then would become of the renegade Democrats and other vermin who had crawled into power through the slime of abolition, and were ready to wade through seas of blood rather than be driven back to the foul dens from which they had emerged.

Secondly. The young General had to encounter the jealousy, open or disguised, of most of the old officers of the army, who looked upon his rapid advancement as a reproach to themselves, and although he had not sought his sudden elevation, visited upon him rather than those who had promoted him, their insidious hostility.

Thirdly. He might have defied party hatred and professional jealousy but for the incessant pressure upon a weak and vacillating President, of the Northern conspirators, who knew him to be too true to the Constitution and

the Union ever to become the instrument of their designs. They could rely upon him neither to aid them in peacefully dissolving the Union nor in making savage war upon private property and State institutions. To them it mattered not that he had in his military proclamations and orders adopted as his guide the principles of the President's Inaugural Address and the subsequent resolution of Congress touching the objects of the war; they would have removed the President if they could; but being unable to do that, they sought by incessant "pressure" to force him to displace every subordinate who was opposed to their revolutionary designs.

Before any considerable movements were consummated in execution of Gen. McClellan's general plans, the President, under the infernal influences already alluded to, began to interfere with them and assume himself the direct command of different portions of the army. On the 27th January, 1862, *without consulting the General-in-Chief*, he issued an order directing the Army at Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the army in Kentucky, the army and army flotilla at Cairo, to move against the rebels simultaneously on the 22d day of the following February, and concluding thus: "That the heads of Departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, *will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.*"

King Canute was told by his courtiers that even the waves of the sea would obey him, and the old king put them to shame by trying the experiment. Whether the courtiers of the President flattered him with the possession of similar power we cannot say; but certain it is that this order was quite as absurd and ridiculous as Canute's order to the approaching waves. And the fact that he issued it without consulting General McClellan, the General-in-Chief, showed that he was either ignorant of official proprieties or designed to treat that General with disrespect. Of course the order became a dead letter, its only effect being to show the childish folly of the President.

In direct opposition to General McClellan's plan for attacking Richmond from the lower Potomac or Chesapeake Bay, the President, on the 31st January, 1862, ordered the Army

of the Potomac to take up a position on the railroad southwest of Manassas Junction, in view to an advance upon Richmond substantially upon the route which, in the late advance of General Grant, has been *almost covered* with the dead bodies of Northern soldiers. The earnest and reiterated representations of General McClellan finally induced the President to give up his own plan and reluctantly acquiesce in that of his General-in-Chief.

The President, however, continued to exhibit on this point the dissatisfaction of one "convinced against his will," and was constantly interfering with McClellan's arrangements repeatedly issuing important orders *without consulting him*. Among them was an order dated the 8th March, 1862, requiring that the Army of the Potomac "shall begin to move upon the bay (Chesapeake) as early as the 18th of March, instant, and *the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day.*" The same order required the co-operation of the army and navy in freeing the Potomac of the enemy's batteries and other obstructions, and prohibited the movement down the bay of more than about fifty thousand men until that object was effected. This was entirely contrary to McClellan's expressed views, as he had no doubt that the rebel batteries on the Potomac would be abandoned as soon as the rebel authorities learnt that Richmond was to be attacked from the Chesapeake bay.

The same order directed that "no change of base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington, such a force, as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief, and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure." Another order issued the same day organized the Army of the Potomac into corps and assigned commanders to each, *all without consulting the General who was in command of the army.*

The "Railsplitter" had evidently taken it into his head that he could manage the war better than any of the educated soldiers, and his vanity in that respect was flattered by envious officers and radical Abolitionists who wished to get rid of General McClellan, be the consequences what they might. His unpardonable sin was, that in all his proclamations and orders he had inculcated the idea that the object of the war was solely to enforce obedience to the Constitution and laws of the United States and not to overthrow

State institutions or destroy private property.

A man less patriotic than General McClellan, or one less conscious of his ability and duty to serve his country, on finding himself annoyed and embarrassed by persistent dissatisfaction at every step, and by capricious, childish and inconsistent orders, issued without the gentlemanly courtesy of consulting him, though he still nominally held the office of General-in-Chief, would have thrown up his commission and retired in despair to private life. But for General McClellan to have done so, would have been voluntarily to surrender the armies of his country into the hands of incompetency and faction which had objects in view beyond the enforcement of the Constitution and laws, to be attained only by a long and bloody war. As was his duty, therefore, he held on to his commission, determined if possible, by a prompt suppression of the rebellion, to save his country from the long agony it is now enduring.

On the 12th of March 1862, an order of the President dated the 11th, was published, relieving General McClellan from his command as General-in-Chief, confining him to the army of the Potomac, and directing the commanders of all the other armies to report directly to the Secretary of War. Of the President's intention to take this step, *no previous intimation was given to General McClellan*. Of course, it defeated at one blow all his plans for co-operative movements for the prompt suppression of the rebellion. Instead, however, of resenting this action or the manner of it, the General said in a letter to the President "you will find that under present circumstances, I shall work just as cheerfully as before, and that no consideration of self, will in any manner, interfere with the discharge of my public duties."

The force estimated by McClellan as necessary to insure success in an advance upon Richmond, was 208,000 men. The precise number of men composing the force actually organized for that expedition cannot be ascertained, but it doubtless fell largely short of 200,000. In the force as originally arranged, with the President's concurrence, were Blenker's division of 10,000 men, 10,000 to be drawn from Fortress Monroe, and McDowell's division of 35,000—making in all 65,000, being more than one-third of the whole.

Fremont had been put in command in Western Virginia, and a "pressure" was made upon the President to take Blenker's

division from McClellan and give it to Fremont. After assuring the former that it should not be done, the President proceeded to do it, and by way of apology wrote to McClellan, "if you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident you would justify it." Thus was he deprived of 10,000 men of his actual force before he left Washington.

Fortress Monroe had been placed under Gen. McClellan's command as a base of operations, and he was authorized to draw from that station ten thousand men. He left Washington on the first of April, reached the Fortress on the 2d, and on the night of the 3d received an order depriving him of the command of that post, and withdrawing the authority previously given him to use ten thousand men there stationed. Thus was he deprived of ten thousand more of the men he relied upon for the capture of Richmond, and was left without any base of operations whatever. *No explanation was ever made to him of this strange proceeding.*

The troops for the defence of Washington remained, as Gen. McClellan supposed, still under his command, and before he left the city he gave them very definite instructions. For the purpose of guarding against any sudden irruption of the rebels into Maryland, he directed Manassas and Chester Gap to be strongly fortified and garrisoned by infantry and artillery with several regiments of cavalry to be employed in constantly scouring the country east and west of the Virginia Mountains that the authorities might be advised of the approach and strength of any force destined for the invasion of Maryland or an attack on Washington. But no sooner had he left the city than his plans were totally disregarded, and the officers, it is presumed in pursuance of orders, ceased to report to him. The consequence was, that in the late raids, the government had no information of the approach or strength of the enemy until he was thundering at their doors!

At this period of the campaign, instead of that unity of command which military men deem essential to success, there were six separate commands wholly or in part within the State of Virginia: viz

- Banks in the valley of the Shenandoah.
- Fremont in Western Virginia.
- McDowell near Fredericksburg.
- Wool at Fortress Monroe.
- Dix on the Eastern Shore.
- McClellan before Richmond.

Wadsworth at Alexandria and vicinity.

These were all independent of each other, receiving their orders directly from the President and Secretary of War, their only superiors in command.

The disastrous effects of presidential incompetence and folly, driven first to one expedient and then another to gratify the jealousy and subserve the personal and factious designs of those around him, will be developed in future letters.

AMOS KENDALL.

Bangor, Me., August 21, 1864.

LETTER XII.

INTRIGUES AT WASHINGTON TO PREVENT M'CLELLAN'S SUCCESS—PRETEXTS FOR WITHDRAWING FROM HIM M'DOWELL'S CORPS—THEIR SUCCESS—FORCE LEFT FOR PROTECTION OF WASHINGTON—A CONTRAST—GENERAL HITCHCOCK AND SENATOR WADE—EFFECT ON THE CAMPAIGN.

To Every Just and Patriotic Man:

In our last letter we left the Army of the Potomac at Fortress Monroe, and its gallant commander deprived of 20,000 of his best men and of all control over the base of his operations. Yet he did not despair of his country, or of success in the enterprise in which he had embarked. In addition to the force left under his immediate command, he relied upon the promise of the President that he should have the aid of McDowell's corps of over 35,000 men, then at Fredericksburg. But there were men in Washington who were determined that General McClellan should never take Richmond, even if the whole Army of the Potomac should be sacrificed to prevent it. They had already induced the President to interfere with his plans, to treat him with marked discourtesy, to take from him the Generalship-in-chief, to deprive him of 20,000 men of his immediate command, and with diabolical assiduity they sought for pretexts to prevent any reinforcements being sent him, not even McDowell's corps, with no other probable motive than that the Army of the Potomac might be driven back or perish, to afford them a triumph over the able, honest, and patriotic man who commanded it.

Under these influences, the Secretary of War, the day after McClellan's departure on his Richmond campaign, directed Generals Hitchcock and Thomas to examine and report whether or not Gen. McClellan had left force enough in and around Washington to make it

perfectly secure as required by the President, and on the same day they reported that *he had not*. Is it not quite singular that the Secretary of War should not have satisfied himself on this score *before McClellan left*? And what could have been the object of instituting this inquiry *after he was gone*? The result showed that *it was simply and only for the purpose of inducing the President to withdraw McDowell's corps from McClellan's support as he had done Blenker's and the troops at Fortress Monroe*.

Washington was in no danger. The rebels had just before withdrawn all their troops from their batteries on the Potomac, had evacuated Manassas, retired beyond the Rappahannock and Rapidan, and were concentrating at Richmond for the defence of their capital. So little did they think of advancing upon Washington, that they had, as they retired, burnt the railroad bridges behind them, even the important bridge across the Rappahannock. In their report, Generals Hitchcock and Thomas indirectly admitted that Washington was in no danger, although they charged that McClellan had not complied with the President's order. They said: "In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair to assume that they have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late position and no large force would be necessary to hold that position." Now, that was the most direct route by which the rebels could reach Washington, and if it was "fair to assume" that they had no intention to return upon that route, it was equally fair to assume that it was no part of their design to advance upon Washington. But this obvious and consistent conclusion would not have accomplished the real object, viz: *the withdrawal of McDowell's corps from the support of McClellan in his advance upon Richmond*. Hence the absurd conclusion that although the approaches to Washington were safe, *the city itself was not!*

But in point of fact, Gen. McClellan had left an abundant force for the protection of Washington and its approaches. For the defence of the approaches to Washington, he left at Warrenton 7,780 men, at Manassas about 10,859, in the Valley of the Shenandoah 35,467, and on the lower Potomac 1,350, in all 55,456 men under the command of Gen. Banks. He also left in Washington and the surrounding forts about 18,000 men, under

the command of General Wadsworth, making in all 73,456 men, with upwards of 100 pieces of light artillery, besides the armament of the forts. In addition to this force, the garrison of Baltimore, about 5,000 men, and many other smaller bodies, might, in a few hours, be concentrated at Washington in case of emergency, and General McClellan recommended that about 7,000 new troops already organized in New York and Pennsylvania should be ordered to Washington.

The idea that Washington, a fortified city, so defended in all its approaches, was in any danger from an enemy rapidly retreating, burning the bridges behind him and hastening to the defence of his own capital, will be scouted by all history as it is now by every intelligent man of common sense and common honesty. But the representations of McClellan's enemies had their desired effect upon the mind of the rail-splitter in command of our armies. Under these influences, on the 3d of April, 1862, only two days after McClellan's departure from Washington, an order was issued directing McDowell's Corps to remain in front of Washington. Thus were largely upward of 100,000 men retained to defend Washington, which was not threatened, nor likely to be by any rebel force, however small?

The intelligent reader cannot but contrast the conduct of the Administration on that occasion, and upon the late advance of General Grant. Then, over 70,000 men were insufficient to make the President feel secure; but when Grant advanced no precautions seemed to have been thought necessary. No advanced posts were fortified and manned to give notice of an enemy's approach; no scouting regiments of cavalry appear to have been employed to ascertain his strength or his designs, as meditated by McClellan. Who can now doubt, that if one half of McClellan's precautions had been adopted, we should have avoided the humiliation of seeing Maryland plundered with impunity under cover of a *sham* attack upon Washington! And the fact that it was a *sham* attack, never designed to be serious, sets out in a stronger light, the perfect security of the city under McClellan's precautions for its defence. It verifies his conclusion, that the rebels would never give up their own capital for the doubtful chance of capturing Washington, which would then have been the certain result of the attempt by any considerable force detached from their army defending Richmond.

General McClellan in his report states, that before he left Washington he sent to General Hitchcock, then occupying staff relations with the President and Secretary of war, a list of the troops he proposed to leave for the defence of Washington and the positions in which he designed posting them. What was the result? "General Hitchcock," says Gen. McClellan, "after glancing his eye over the list, observed that he was not the judge of what was required for defending the capital; that *General McClellan's position was such as to enable him to understand the subject much better than he did and he presumed that if the force designated was in his judgment sufficient, nothing more would be required* He was then told * * * * that I would be glad to have his opinions as an old and experienced officer. To this he replied, that as *I had had the entire control of the defenses for a long time I was the best judge of what was needed*, and he declined to give any other expression of opinion at that time." But no sooner had General McClellan left the city on the perilous service of his country, than this "old and experienced officer" is found to have decided opinions on this subject which he is very ready to express!

If any one desires to learn the spirit which actuated General Hitchcock in regard to General McClellan, let him read that General's testimony before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. He will find in it an embodiment of that jealousy and hatred from some of the old officers which our young and rising chieftain had to encounter. General Hitchcock met, in the chairman of the committee, Hon. B. F. Wade, a congenial spirit, who, after the General had testified to McClellan's violation of orders in this case, put to him the following question, viz:

"What is the penalty under military rules for such a disobedience of orders?"

General Hitchcock answered, "The penalty for disobedience of orders is stated in the 9th Article of War. *IT IS DEATH, or such other punishment as a general court martial may think proper to inflict.*"

Both the question and answer were wholly irrelevant and only showed the spirit which dictated them.

This testimony was given in January 1863, after General McClellan saved the Army of the Potomac, though deprived by intrigues at Washington of more than a third of its force, and after he had saved the city from capture and the country from humiliation by the bat-

tle of Antietam, and while he was still at the head of army training it for the achievement of new victories. Yes, this man was declared guilty of a crime punishable with death because he did not leave more than 73 000 men and 100 cannon for the defence of Washington against an enemy *who was running away from it as fast as his legs could carry him!*

General McClellan received the order detaching McDowell's corps from his command before Yorktown about the 6th of April 1862. He thus describes its immediate effect upon him and his operations, viz :

"The President having promised in our interview following his order of March 31st, withdrawing Blenker's division of 10,000 men from my command, that nothing of the sort should be repeated, that I might rest assured that the campaign should proceed with no further deductions from the force upon which its operations had been planned, I may confess to having been shocked at this order, which, with that of 31st ult., removed nearly 60,000 men from my command, and reduced my force by more than one third after its task had been assigned, its operations planned, its fighting begun. To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a different, and a less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. It was a fatal error."

Many a man after being treated in this manner would have thrown up his command; but such a step at that time would have been most damaging to the cause of his country and most fatal to his own reputation. General McClellan, therefore, determined to persist in his advance upon Richmond, relying for success on his own skill and the bravery of his men, though not without hope that he should still receive heavy reinforcements.

AMOS KENDALL.

August 16, 1864.

LETTER XIII.

INTRIGUES AGAINST M'CLELLAN—THE PRESIDENT ADVISES AND THREATENS—YORKTOWN AND WILLIAMSBURG—THANKS OF CONGRESS—BEFORE RICHMOND—WAR DEPARTMENT DOES NOT ANSWER HIS TELEGRAMS—APPEALS TO THE PRESIDENT—M'DOWELL'S CORPS ORDERED TO JOIN HIM—JACKSON'S EXPEDITION TO THE VALLEY—ORDER TO M'DOWELL COUNTERMANDED AND HIS FORCE SENT TO CATCH JACKSON, &C—THE PRESIDENT THOUGH TOLD IT WAS IMPRACTICABLE STILL PERSISTS—41,000 MEN RENDERED USE-

LESS AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC ABANDONED TO ITS FATE.

In our last letter we left General McClellan before Yorktown despoiled of more than one-third of the force which had been promised him for the capture of Richmond. His plan of campaign had been to land McDowell's corps at some point east of York river, turn Gloucester and Yorktown and compel their immediate evacuation without the delay of a regular siege. The withdrawal of McDowell's corps left him without a sufficient force to venture on that movement, and he was compelled to drive the rebels out of Yorktown by regular approaches. In this operation a precious month was occupied, owing in part to the want of effective co-operation by the navy. During this period, the enemies of McClellan, having, by taking from him more than a third of his force, made it impossible for him to progress faster, clamored for his removal from the command because he did not do what they had deprived him of the power to do. Indeed, if credible rumors were true, there were members of Congress at that time, who declared that McClellan could not and *should not* take Richmond, and the northern disunion newspapers distinctly indicated that his success would be considered by them a great misfortune. A prompt suppression of the rebellion would have been fatal to their revolutionary designs. The President himself, after crippling McClellan's force, seems to have participated in the dissatisfaction and now and then exhibited it by giving sage advice.

On the 6th of April, before the arrival of several of his divisions, the President says to McClellan in a message, "*I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick river at once.*" On the 9th of April, he wrote to the General, "I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you, is with you by this time, and if so, *I think this is the precise time to strike a blow * * **" "and once more, let me tell you, it is indispensable to you, that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this." "*Once more!*" Then he had previously told the General that it was indispensable to *himself personally* that he should strike a blow. How "indispensable," and what did the President mean in saying "I am powerless to help this?" Does he mean, that he was so completely in the power of Gen. McClellan's factious enemies, that he should be compelled to dismiss him from the command if he did not speedily

achieve some great success? What else could he mean? Again, the President says, "the country will not fail to note—is now noting—that the present hesitation to move upon the intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated," and he concluded by saying, "but you must act." The long and short of the story is, that the President had taken from McClellan the means of achieving prompt success and threatened him with removal if he did not achieve it. It is the old story over again of the Israelites and the Pharaoh "who knew not Joseph."

Making the best use he could with the force left at his disposal, McClellan succeeded in compelling the rebels to evacuate Yorktown on the third day of May, and on the fifth gained a victory at Williamsburg. On the announcement of the news in the House of Representatives, Mr. Wickliffe, of Kentucky spoke, as follows:

"I have been pained Mr. Speaker, during the fore part of this session—almost during the whole of the session—at whispers, if not combinations, with a view of disturbing the position of that General. I know him not, personally, but I have great confidence in him from the reputation which I had from sources that satisfied me. And I rise now, sir, more to appeal to those gentlemen who have been disposed to find fault and have him removed from his command than to pass a compliment or encomium upon him. I hope I will not hear any more whispers that McClellan should be removed from his command."

On the ninth the following resolutions, offered by the Hon. Owen Lovejoy, passed the House of Representatives by an unanimous vote, viz:

Resolved, That it is with feelings of devout gratitude to Almighty God that the House of Representatives, from time to time, hears of the triumphs of the Union army in the great struggle for the supremacy of the Constitution and the integrity of the Union.

Resolved, That we receive with profound satisfaction intelligence of the recent victories achieved by the armies of the Potomac, associated from their localities with those of the Revolution, and that the sincere thanks of this House are hereby tendered to Major-General George B. McClellan for the display of those high military qualities which secure important results with but little sacrifice of human life."

McClellan's success, however, instead of allaying opposition to him only rendered it more bitter and vindictive.

He was the rising sun which it was necessary for the twinkling stars of military rivals to becloud, lest they should be lost sight of in his brightness; he was the able General,

the devoted patriot and the pure man, already the idol of the army and the hope of the country, whom selfish politicians deemed it necessary to remove from their path; he was the incorruptible and unchangeable friend of "the Constitution as it is and the Union as it was," the uncompromising enemy of the Northern conspirators whose revolutionary objects could never be accomplished with such a man at the head of the army or of the nation.

At length, General McClellan found himself before Richmond with the force which the President had deigned to allow him, then not much exceeding 85,000 men fit for service instead of 200,000 whom he had deemed necessary to render success certain beyond peradventure. In the meantime, the rebels had collected and were collecting an immense army for the defence of their capital, estimated, no doubt truly, at over 200,000 men. Gen. McClellan did not fail to represent to the Secretary of War the state of things before Richmond and beg for reinforcements. No attention appears to have been given to his representations, and on the 14th of May, he addressed a letter to the President of which the following passages are extracts, viz:

"I have more than twice telegraphed to the Secretary of War, stating that in my opinion the enemy were concentrating all their available force to fight this army in front of Richmond, and that such ought to be their policy. I have received no reply whatever to any of these telegraphs. I beg leave to repeat their substance to your Excellency, and to ask that kind consideration which you have ever accorded to my representations and views.

"All my information from every source accessible to me, establishes the fixed purpose of the rebels to defend Richmond against this army by offering us battle with all the troops they can collect from East, West and South, and my own opinion is confirmed by that of all my commanders whom I have been able to consult. Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much weakened my force, and will continue to do so. I cannot bring into actual battle against the enemy more than eighty thousand men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in position, probably intrenched, a much larger force—perhaps double my numbers. * * * I most respectfully and earnestly urge upon your Excellency, that the opportunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you will cause this army to be reinforced without delay by all the disposable troops of the Government. I ask for every man that the Government can send me. Any commander of the reinforcements whom your Excellency may designate, will be acceptable

to me, whatever expression I may have heretofore addressed to you on that subject. I will fight the enemy, whatever their force may be, with whatever force I may have, and I firmly believe that we shall beat them; but our triumph should be made decisive and complete. The soldiers of this army love their Government, and will fight well in its support; you may rely upon them. They have confidence in me as their General, and in you as their President. Strong reinforcements will at least save the lives of many of them. The greater our force, the more perfect will be our combinations, and the less our loss. For obvious reasons, I beg you to give immediate consideration to this communication, and to inform me fully at the earliest moment of your final determination."

This letter seems to have roused the President to the realization, that he had other duties to perform than the protection of Washington against imaginary dangers. He, therefore, directed that McDowell's corps, then represented by the Secretary of War to be between thirty five and forty thousand men and by McDowell himself, forty-one thousand, should at once co-operate with McClellan in the attack upon Richmond, and it was arranged that he should commence his march on the 26th of May.

At this crisis, General Lee, who seems to have understood what sort of men he had to deal with in Washington, started an expedition of a few thousand men under Stonewall Jackson to the Shenandoah Valley for the purpose of scaring them out of their propriety and preventing their sending reinforcements to McClellan. He chased Banks, whose force had been greatly reduced to strengthen McDowell, from Strasburg to the Potomac river, defeating him at Winchester, and then leaving just enough men with the aid of false reports by pretended deserters and lying contrabands to keep up the alarm at Washington, he hastened back to participate in the defence of Richmond. Unfortunately, this *ruse* had the desired effect. The order to McDowell to co-operate with McClellan in the capture of Richmond was countermanded, and he was directed to employ his force in a scheme to intercept Jackson's command on its return from the pursuit of Banks; and here it is the painful duty of the historian to state, that the President had every assurance that the opinion of Gen. McDowell could give him that the service which he required was impossible; and yet he persisted in the order! This damaging fact is proved by the following correspondence; viz:

WASHINGTON, MAY 24TH, 1862.

Major General McDowell, Fredericksburg:

General Fremont has been ordered, by telegraph, to move from Franklin or Harrisonburg to relieve General Banks, and capture or destroy Jackson's and Ewell's forces. You are instructed, laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, to put twenty thousand men in motion at once for the Shenandoah, moving on the line, or in advance of the line, of the Manassas Gap railroad. Your object will be to capture the forces of Jackson and Ewell, either in co-operation with General Fremont; or in case want of supplies or transportation interferes with his movement, it is believed the force with which you move will be sufficient to accomplish the object alone. The information thus far received here makes it probable that, if the enemy operates actively against General Banks, you will not be able to count upon much assistance from him, but may even have to release him. Reports received this moment are that Banks is fighting with Ewell, eight miles from Winchester.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MAY 24TH, 1864.

The President's order has been received and is in process of execution. This is a crushing blow to us.

IRWIN McDOWELL,
Major General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, May 24th, 1862. }

Major General McDowell:

I am highly gratified by your alacrity in obeying my orders. The change was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you, or to any one. Everything now depends upon the celerity and vigor of your movement.

A. LINCOLN.

HEADQ'RS DEPARTMENT OF RAPPAHANNOCK,
OPPOSITE FREDERICKSBURG,
May 24th, 1862. }

His Excellency the President:

I obeyed your order immediately, for it was positive and urgent; and perhaps, as a subordinate, there I ought to stop; but I trust I may be allowed to say something in relation to the subject, especially in view of your remark, that everything now depends upon the celerity and vigor of my movement. I beg to say, that co-operation between Gen. Fremont and myself, to cut off Jackson or Ewell, is not to be counted upon, even if it is not a practical impossibility. Next, that I am entirely beyond helping distance of Gen. Banks, and no celerity or vigor will avail, so far as he is concerned. Next, that by a glance at the map, it will be seen that the line of retreat of the enemy's forces, up the valley, is shorter than mine to go against him. It will take a week or ten days for the force to get to the Valley by the route which will give it food and forage, and by that time the enemy will have retired. I shall gain nothing for you there, and shall lose much for you here. It is, therefore, not only on personal grounds that I have heavy heart in the matter, but that I feel it throws

us all back; and from Richmond North we shall have all our large masses paralyzed, and shall have to repeat what we have just accomplished. I have ordered Gen. Shields to commence the movement by to-morrow morning. A second division will follow in the afternoon. Did I understand you aright, that you wished that I, personally, should accompany this expedition? Very respectfully,

IRWIN McDOWELL.

"This is a crushing blow to us," said Gen. McDowell. Why "a crushing blow?" He had a corps of 41,000 men preparing to march in two days upon Richmond; it was impossible for him to aid Banks; it was next to impossible for him to co-operate with Fremont; it would require a longer march to intercept Jackson than Jackson had to make to escape him; he says, "*I shall gain nothing for you there, and lose much for you here.*" *

"*I feel that it throws us all back, and from Richmond north we shall have all our large force paralyzed.*" Well might the frank and patriotic General say "*I have a heavy heart in the matter,*" and it amazes one, that the President, having the consequences so plainly set before him, did not revoke his fatal order. But he had set "*a trap*" (to use his own language as testified by Gen. McDowell,) *to catch Jackson,* and though plainly told it was an useless experiment, he sacrificed the certainty of capturing Richmond, in the vain attempt! And that sacrifice has cost the nation more than a hundred thousand Northern lives, and hundreds of millions of Northern money, and *the end is not yet!!*

AMOS KENDALL.

August 19th, 1864.

LETTER XIV.

FAILURE OF LINCOLN'S "TRAP"—REVERTS TO HIS ORIGINAL PLAN—ARMY OF POTOMAC ABANDONED TO ITS FATE—M'CLELLAN WARNS THE PRESIDENT AGAIN AND AGAIN—HE IS INCREDULOUS—BATTLES—JACKSON ATTACKS M'CLELLAN'S RIGHT—WHO RESPONSIBLE—MASTERLY RETREAT TO JAMES RIVER—THUS DID THE PRESIDENT PREVENT THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND.

To every just and patriotic man:

In our last letter, we left General McClellan before Richmond, cheered by the promise that General McDowell's splendid corps of 41,000 men should march on the 26th of May to aid him in the capture of that city. The right wing of his army had been extended towards Fredericksburg to meet the promised co operation.

We left Stonewall Jackson, after chasing Banks down the Shenandoah Valley to the Potomac, and effectually alarming the authorities at Washington, hastening back to aid Lee in the defence of Richmond.

We left McDowell "with a heavy heart," preparing under protest to play his part in "*the trap*" set by the President to catch Stonewall Jackson.

The result fully verified McDowell's anticipations. His splendid corps was broken up and rendered for the time being perfectly useless. A part of it was marched to Front Royal, a part to Manassas, a part sent to Harper's Ferry, and a part remained at Fredericksburg. Jackson, on his return march, encountered Fremont, and having crippled him in a spirited engagement so that he could not pursue, continued his progress towards Richmond.

And what said the President when he found the game had escaped his "*trap*?" General McDowell, in his testimony before the Congress committee, testified as follows, viz:

"When the President, as he expressed himself, found that the trap had failed, and that Jackson was being pursued instead of being intercepted, *he wanted to recur to the original plan of going to Richmond.* He telegraphed that *he had with great reluctance given up that plan, and in the meantime had ordered McCall with his division to go by water to Richmond.*"

The palpable meaning of all this is that, the President, not at all regretting that he had rendered useless forty-one thousand men by sending them on his trapping expedition, instead of reinforcing McClellan with them, was then inclined to leave McClellan and the army of the Potomac then before Richmond to their fate, and revert to his original plan of advancing upon Richmond by land. He seems to regret that he had suffered McClellan's division to reinforce McClellan by water, and had not reserved it to form a portion of a new army to carry out his "*original plan.*" We do not believe the President guilty of the inconceivable atrocity of *intending* to sacrifice the army of the Potomac for the purpose of defeating McClellan's plan of campaign, and recommending his own; but we are free to say, that his orders and acts could not have been more disastrous to the army and the country had such been his deliberate purpose. Gen. McClellan and the army of the Potomac were let to their fate, and the President *did* revert to his original plan by the organization

of the army of Virginia and the appointment of Gen. Pope to command it.

On the 25th of May, the President was so alarmed by false reports that he thought the main force of the rebel army was approaching Washington, and telegraphed Gen. McClellan:

"I think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as could not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defence of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come back to the defence of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly."

On the same day, McClellan replied,

"Telegram received. Independently of it the time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. The object of the movement is probably to prevent reinforcements being sent to me. All the information received from balloons, deserters, prisoners and contrabands, agrees in the statement that the mass of the rebel troops are still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to defend it."

On the 27th of May, a decided victory was achieved over the rebels at Hanover Court House by troops under the command of Gen. Fitz John Porter.

On the 28th of May, Gen. McClellan telegraphed to the Secretary of War, "there is no doubt that the enemy are concentrating everything on Richmond. * * * It is the policy and duty of the government to send me by water all the well drilled troops available. I am confident Washington is in no danger. Engines and cars in large numbers have been sent up to bring down Jackson's command. * * * The real issue is in the battle about to be fought in front of Richmond. * * * It cannot be ignored that a desperate battle is before us; if any regiment of good troops remain unemployed, it will be an irreparable fault committed."

The President could not be made to believe that Washington was in no danger, or that the rebels were concentrating everything on Richmond, and in a message to McClellan of the same date, he said, "that the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think cannot be certainly known to you or me."

On the 31st of May and 1st of June, were fought the battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks in which the assaults of the enemy were repulsed with great slaughter."

Rains and floods rendered the roads and the Chickahominy unavailable for heavy mili-

tary movements for more than three weeks. When the rains ceased and the roads became passable, movements were resumed and preparations made for a general attack on the enemy's lines. On the 25th of June, the day before the general movement was to have been made, certain intelligence reached Gen. McClellan, that Stonewall Jackson having escaped the Lincoln Trap, was near with his army marching to attack his right wing and cut off his communications, and also that Beauregard had arrived in Richmond from the South with strong reinforcements. In a message to the Secretary of War of that date, Gen. McClellan said:—"I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand including Jackson and Beauregard. * * I regret my great inferiority of numbers, but feel I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of reinforcements, that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the government should be concentrated here. I will do all a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate."

On the 26th of June, as was anticipated, Jackson attacked McClellan's right wing, and after a desperate fight and terrible slaughter, so far succeeded as to make it necessary to withdraw it across the Chickahominy. The operations of the day showed that the rebel army so far exceeded General McClellan's in numbers as to make decisive victory on his part entirely hopeless.

On the 27th it was determined to retire to the James river, for which movement, as a possible contingency, General McClellan had previously made some preparations. The necessary orders were promptly issued, and on the 28th portions of the army were in motion. On the latter day, Gen. McClellan transmitted a message to the Secretary of War, giving the results of the battle and concluded as follows:

"I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to-night, I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades, to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly, that I owe no thanks to you, or any other persons in Wash-

ington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."

The retreat to James river by the Army of the Potomac in the presence of an enemy more than double its numbers, without the loss of a gun or a wagon by the assaults of the enemy, is one of the most remarkable military feats on record. Of itself it is enough to immortalize in history that army and its commander. Gen. McClellan each day directed the commanders of corps what to do that day, and night with few exceptions found each of them in their appointed places. Each corps and division fulfilled its assigned duty as if each had been a part of one great machine. Whenever the enemy attempted to interrupt them they turned upon and repulsed him with terrible slaughter, and then resumed their march. In this manner, the Army of the Potomac, baffled but neither conquered nor discouraged, after seven days marching and fighting, reached a resting place on James river. Their loss in killed, wounded and prisoners during the seven days, was over 15,000; that of the enemy in killed and wounded was doubtless much the greatest.

Such was the result of the President's interferences with McClellan's plans. First, he prevented a rapid advance upon Richmond and its probable capture by withholding McDowell's corps at the outset of the campaign. Then again, after promising that corps, by withdrawing it to complete his trap to catch Jackson, he deprived McClellan of a reinforcement of 41,000 and prevented the capture of Richmond before Jackson could join Lee. In short, the President's sagacious management culminated in depriving McClellan of 41,000 men and increasing Lee's army by Jackson's corps probably 20,000, making a relative difference in the strength of the two armies of about 60,000 men! Thus did President Lincoln prevent the capture of Richmond.

AMOS KENDALL.

August 20, 1864.

LETTER XIV.

PROOFS OF GENERAL McCLELLAN'S LOYALTY—IN WHAT HE AND LINCOLN AGREE AND IN WHAT THEY DIFFER—HIS LETTER CONSISTENT WITH CHICAGO PLATFORM—OPPOSITION TO HIM IS SUPPORT OF LINCOLN—OUR FUTURE IN CASE OF LINCOLN'S RE-ELECTION.

To all Just and Patriotic Men:

Before we proceed with our exposition of the conduct of the Administration towards the

army of the Potomac and the able General who created it, we turn aside to say a few words about the Democratic nominations and define the issues now before the country.

The objections to General McClellan as a candidate for the Presidency are both amusing and instructive. In this one thing the Lincolnites and those whom they call Copperheads cordially agree. The Lincolnites are endeavoring to prove that McClellan, in his acts, is too much like Lincoln to be a fitting candidate for Copperheads, and the latter echo the sentiment. If any thing were wanting beyond his own declarations to establish General McClellan's uncompromising loyalty, it is furnished by the concurrence of that point of these two extreme factions. It proves, that General McClellan is a fitting candidate to be voted for by all *Conservative Republicans* as well as Democrats.

But McClellan and Lincoln agree on only one point, and that is a professed determination to *maintain the Union at every hazard*.

They differ radically in relation to the best means to accomplish that end.

Lincoln has a *preliminary* to the restoration of the Union, and that is the abandonment of slavery by the seceded States. He will not let them return to the Union without the relinquishment of a right held in common by all the States—by Massachusetts as well as South Carolina. To force the abandonment of this right upon the Southern States while it is enjoyed by the Northern, whether they choose to exercise it or not, he would sacrifice hundreds of thousands of northern lives and thousands of millions of northern money. In short, he is not waging war to maintain the Constitutional Union based on the equality of the States, but to enforce on the Southern States a *new Union*, in which their relation to the Northern shall be that of conquered provinces, deriving their local institutions, not from the will of the people, but from the prescriptions of the conqueror.

McClellan, on the other hand, would wage war for no other purpose than disarming rebels and enforcing the Constitution and laws, *just as they are*. That done, the Union would be *ipso facto* restored, and each State would stand in its original position of equal rights and equal privileges.

Lincoln will receive no proposition for the restoration of peace and union which does not also propose the abolition of slavery.

McClellan, on the other hand, "so soon as

it is clear or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace on the basis of the Union," would "exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practiced by civilized nations and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, re establish the Union and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State."

McClellan is for the *old Union* founded on consent, only insisting that the Southern States shall be faithful to their engagements.

Lincoln is in favor of a *new Union* founded on conquest, and supported by minorities in the conquered States backed by bayonets.

In short, McClellan is for *permanent peace* and Lincoln virtually for *perpetual war*.

Which ought conservative Democrats and Republicans vote for?

But some of the so-called peace Democrats, it seems, think General McClellan's letter of acceptance incompatible with the Chicago platform. In what respect? The platform declares "That in the future, as in the past, we will adhere with unswerving fidelity to the Union under the Constitution as the only solid foundation of our strength, security and happiness as a people, and as a frame work of government equally conducive to the welfare and prosperity of all the States, both Northern and South."

Gen. McClellan declares that "the Union must be preserved at all hazards." Now, what is the difference between a declaration of "unswerving fidelity to the Union" and a declaration that it "must be preserved at all hazards?" And how can men who voted for the former declaration, refuse to vote for McClellan because he made the latter?

But the platform declares that: "justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare, demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate Convention of all the States, or other peaceable means to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored upon the basis of the Federal Union of the States." And Gen. McClellan says nothing about armistice or convention. Not in terms, but he does say what includes them and *much more*. He says that as soon as it is "even probable" that the rebels are "ready for peace upon the basis of the Constitution," "all the resources of statesmanship" &c., "should be exhausted to secure it." Is not

an armistice and a convention within "the resources of statesmanship?" The fact is, that Gen. McClellan does not confine himself to those specific means, but he does commit himself to resort to *those* or any other honorable means which circumstances at the time may show to be more efficient to the end, whenever there is *even a probability* that the rebels are prepared to treat. What can any "unswerving" friend of the Union ask more? Would any man desire the Government to offer an armistice when there is *not the least probability* that it would be accepted?

What can any "unswerving" friend of the Union, who thinks it can be saved by stopping the war, gain by refusing to vote for McClellan? McClellan stands pledged to stop it the moment the Southern States show or indicate a willingness to live in peace *within the Union as it was*. Lincoln will neither stop the war nor even listen to a proposition for peace, until the people of the seceded States give up one of their reserved rights. Which holds out the best prospect for peace, and which ought the most ultra man to prefer? By not supporting McClellan, he will aid in the re-election of Lincoln, *as truly as if he voted for him*. He makes himself responsible not only for the continuance of the war for the abolition of slavery, but for all the abuses and usurpations of the present Administration. Every citizen is responsible for public wrongs to aid in preventing which he has the power, but will not use it. Nor would the responsibility be lessened by running a third candidate, with a perfect knowledge that it could have no other practical effect than to aid in the re-election of Mr. Lincoln. Under these circumstances, every *truly* "unswerving" friend of the restoration of the Union *as it was* will support Gen. McClellan, cordially, we should hope, but, if from no other higher motive, *as "a choice of evils."*

There are two things for which every true patriot should now pray and labor—one is, *the success of the national arms*, so that the rebels shall be satisfied of the utter hopelessness of their cause, and be inclined to give it up and return to their allegiance. The other is, *the election of Gen. McClellan*, thus opening to them the door for restoration and peace on the only conditions which will render any cordial reunion possible. But should Mr. Lincoln be re-elected, and persist in his present policy, we see nothing in the future of our country but an interminable war of guerrillas,

if not of large armies, further disintegrations of territory, crushing taxation, bankruptcy and repudiation, an end of all truly republican government, the domination of unprincipled military chieftains, and a never-ending succession of revolutions, instigated by foreign intrigue and personal ambition, until our people become powerless, as now in Mexico, to defend themselves against the armies of some European despot which shall come to force upon them as Emperor the imported scion of some royal house; or, at best, until exhausted by internal strife, they submit, as their only alternative for peace and security, to some victorious chief, and become a great consolidated empire under a native dynasty. All which may God in his mercy avert.

AMOS KENDALL.

September 13, 1864.

LETTER XV.

THE PRESIDENT'S THANKS TO THE ARMY—NONE FROM WAR DEPARTMENT—M'CLELLAN TO BE GOTTEN RID OF—A MONTH LOST—ARMY ORDERED TO AQUIA CREEK—ARMY OF VIRGINIA—REBELS ADVANCE TOWARDS WASHINGTON—ATTEMPT TO HOLD M'CLELLAN RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAYS—HE REPORTS AND ASKS WHAT HE SHALL DO—NO ANSWER—ASKS TO SHARE THE FATE OF HIS MEN—IS NOT ALLOWED—IS DEPRIVED OF ALL COMMAND—HIS ASSISTANCE IMPLOR'D—IS PUT IN COMMAND OF WASHINGTON'S DEFENCES AND FINALLY OF POPE'S DEFEATED ARMY.

To all Just and Patriotic Men:

Our thirteenth letter left the Army of the Potomac at Harrison's Landing on the James River, twenty-five miles from Richmond, whither it had been compelled to retire before overwhelming numbers in consequence of the withdrawal, by order of the President, of McDowell's corps, then consisting of forty-one thousand men.

When it was too late, the President seems, for a time, to have become sensible of the injustice, not to say cruelty, he had practiced towards that gallant army and its able Commander. On the 21 of July, 1862, he telegraphed to Gen. McClellan as follows:

"If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. Try just now to save the army material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can."

The next day, having heard of the safe arrival of the army at Harrison's Landing, he again telegraphed Gen. McClellan as follows:

"I am satisfied, that yourself, officers and

men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it."

On the 5th of July the President sent to Gen. McClellan the following message, viz:

"A thousand thanks for the relief which your two despatches of 12 and 1 P. M. yesterday gave me. Be assured that the heroism and skill of yourself, officers and men, is and forever will be appreciated. *If you can hold your present position, we shall hve the enemy yet.*"

But not a word of commendation came from the Secretary of War or the General in-Chief. Feeling this injustice to his brave army Gen. McClellan afterwards sent to Gen. Halleck the following message, viz:

"Please say a kind word to my army, that I can repeat to them in general orders, in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court House, and on the Chickahominy, as well as in regard to the seven days, and the recent retreat.

"No one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself. Say nothing about me; merely give my men and officers credit for what they have done. It will do you much good, and will strengthen you much with them if you issue a handsome order to them in regard to what they have accomplished. They deserve it."

To this there was no response whatever.

We have no doubt but the tribute paid by the President in his messages to the army of the Potomac and its officers, was as sincere as it was just. And it will be perceived, that at that time, the President did not contemplate the withdrawal of that army, but proposed to reinforce it where it was. This was in accordance with the views and wishes of General McClellan. His plan was, when reinforced, as stated by General Halleck in a report to the Secretary of War, to do precisely what General Grant is doing now, attack Petersburg and cut off the communications of Richmond with the South.

Other plans, however, had been concocted at Washington, one object of which was to get rid of General McClellan by taking his army away from him. To his repeated requests for reinforcements, he was told none could be sent to him. In vain he pointed to various bodies of troops which might with facility be added to his command, and pledged himself to take Richmond if they would but give him fifty thousand more men. The answer still was "they had none to send him." What had become of the 73 000 men left by General McClellan for the defence of Washington and its approaches, of McDowell's corps amounting when ordered after Jackson to 41,000; of

Fremont's command amounting, it is presumed, to at least 25,000, and the many thousands which had reached Washington from the East after General McClellan left on his peninsular campaign, in all not much short of 150,000 men!

It was on the 3d of July, that the last of the army of the Potomac reached Harrison's Landing, and it was not until the 3d of August that General McClellan, notwithstanding his urgent appeals, could find out what was to be done with it. On the latter day, he was informed by General Halleck, who had been made General in Chief, that it was determined to withdraw his army from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek. General McClellan remonstrated with all his powers of language against this step; but the authorities at Washington were inflexible. It was not, however, until the 16th of August that the last of the men and materials could be removed from Harrison's Landing.

Thus was more than a month lost by the indecision of the authorities at Washington. For this delay, General McClellan was not in the least responsible. He frequently asked for the decision of the Government in language like the following. In a message dated the 18th July, he said:

"Am anxious to have determination of Government that no time may be lost in preparing for it. Hours are very precious now and perfect unity of action necessary."

In another message dated the 30th of July, he said:

"I hope that it may soon be decided what is to be done by this army, and that the decision may be to reinforce it at once. We are losing much valuable time, and that at a moment when energy and decision are sadly needed."

Thus, not from any fault of Gen. McClellan, but through want of decision at Washington, an army of eighty to ninety thousand men was rendered perfectly useless for nearly six weeks.

In the mean time, the President's plan of advancing upon Richmond by land, appears to have been resumed. A new army called the army of Virginia was organized, composed of the remnants of McDowell's corps, Fremont's army and the troops about Washington, and Gen. Pope was placed in command. It was a portion of this new plan of campaign that the Army of the Potomac should be merged in this new army, and that General McClellan should thus be deprived of his command without being directly dismissed.

It was in pursuance of this scheme that, after a month's apparent hesitation, the Army of the Potomac was ordered from Harrison's Landing to Aquia Creek.

As soon as the rebel leaders perceived that they were no longer to be seriously pressed near Richmond, they resolved to carry war into the loyal States and advanced with their main army towards Washington. Had the decision to reinforce the army of Virginia with the Army of the Potomac been announced two weeks sooner, as it might have been, the junction would have been formed before the rebel army could reach the Union lines and Lee would have found himself confronted by a superior force. But the delay of the government to give the order enabled him to fall upon the army of Virginia before the reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac could be gotten into position. And the disaster to Pope's army was as much attributable to this mismanagement at Washington as to the incompetency of its commander.

When the consequences of the delay to give the order for the transfer of the Army of the Potomac began to develop themselves, the authorities at Washington most unjustly attempted to fix the responsibility on Gen. McClellan. In a message, dated August 9th, Gen. Halleck said to him:

"I am of opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them and move forward to the Potomac. You must send reinforcements instantly to Aquia Creek. Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory."

This was but six days after the order for the movement of the whole army, consisting of eighty to ninety thousand men with all its material, had been given. General McClellan said in his reply:—"There has been no unnecessary delay as you assert, not an hour; but everything has been and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to carry out your orders."

On the 10th of August, Gen. Halleck telegraphed Gen. McClellan as follows:

"The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting Gen. Pope today; there must be no further delay in your movements. That which has already occurred was entirely unexpected and must be satisfactorily explained. Let not a moment be lost and telegraph me daily what progress you have made in executing the order to transfer your troops."

Gen. McClellan in his reply said:

"I assure you again, that there has not

been any unnecessary delay in carrying out your orders."

And after detailing the progress made and making, he added :

"The present moment is probably not the proper one for me to refer to the unnecessarily harsh and unjust tone of your telegrams of late. It will, however, make no difference in my official action."

On this as on other occasions, it seems to have been thought at Washington that large armies with all their material can be moved hundreds of miles as easily as a flock of wild geese and almost as quickly. There would have been no occasion for Gen. Halleck's ill-humor in this case, if he had given the order to transfer two or three weeks sooner.

General McClellan reported from Aquia Creek on the 24th of August, and on the 26th was requested to go to Alexandria, where, General Halleck stated, "great irregularities are reported." On the same day he went to Alexandria and betook himself to the task of correcting irregularities and sending out to the aid of General Pope, as they arrived, the various detachments of the army of the Potomac. Although he was daily and almost hourly called upon to perform some specific duty, no definite command was assigned to him. In a message to the President on the 29th of August, he said :

"Tell me what you wish me to do and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you may give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay any longer."

A copy of the same message was sent to General Halleck ; but to that portion of it, no answer was returned. On the 30th the sound of battle was heard in Alexandria, and General McClellan telegraphed as follows to General Halleck :

"I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask that if there is a probability of the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to be with my own men, if nothing more ; they will fight none the worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command, even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. Please reply to this to-night."

It appears that Gen. Halleck did not read the despatch until the next day, when he

merely replied, "I cannot answer without seeing the President, as Gen. Pope is in command by his orders, of the Department." As General McClellan did not ask the command of his men, but only to "share their fate on the field of battle," this answer was a denial of his request.

On the same day, however, an order was issued from the War Department containing the following clauses :

"Gen. McClellan commands that portion of the Army of the Potomac that has not been sent forward to General Pope's command. General Pope commands the Army of Virginia, and all the forces temporarily attached to it."

As not two hundred men of the Army of the Potomac remained under McClellan's orders, this disposition left him but a mockery of command, and was in fact the consummation of the design to get rid of him by merging his army in the Army of Virginia.

"*Man proposes but God disposes.*" That very day, General Pope was defeated and his army was then hastening towards Washington in wild disorder.

The next day, General Halleck implores the assistance of General McClellan in the following words, viz :

"*I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am entirely tired out.*"

On the next day, the 1st of September, General McClellan at General Halleck's request, came to Washington. In an interview with that General, he was instructed to take command of the defences of the city, expressly limited to the works and their garrisons and forbidden to exercise any control over the troops operating in front under General Pope.

In the afternoon of the same day, he was invited to an interview with the President, who was greatly moved with the apprehension that the troops who had composed the army of the Potomac, actuated by resentment at the treatment they and their favorite General had received, would not cordially cooperate with General Pope. He told General McClellan that he had always been his friend, assured him that he alone could rectify the evil, and begged him to do so by a message to some of his old officers. Although the General had, and expressed perfect faith in his old associates, to gratify the President, he sent to General Fitz John Porter the following message :

"I ask of you for my sake, and that of the

country, and the old army of the Potomac, that you and all my friends, will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope, in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our army are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful co-operation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to my friends in the army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is, that for their country's sake they will extend to General Pope, the same support they ever have to me.

"I am in charge of the defences of Washington, and am doing all I can to render your retreat safe, should that become necessary."

What took place the next day Gen. McClellan describes in his Report, as follows:

"On the morning of the 21 the President and Gen. Halleck came to my house, when the President informed me that Colonel Kelton had returned from the front; that our affairs were in bad condition; that the army was in full retreat upon the defences of Washington; the roads filled with stragglers, &c. He instructed me to take steps at once and collect the stragglers, place the works in a proper state of defence, and to go out to meet, and take command of the army when it approached the vicinity of the works; then to put the troops in the best position for defence; committing everything to my hands.

I immediately took steps to carry out these orders."

Thus, on the 30th of August, traitorous abolitionism which hated Gen. McClellan for his loyalty to the Constitution, co-operating with military and political jealousy, succeeded in depriving McClellan of all command.

On the 31st the storm thickens and he is implored to aid the Washington authorities with his "ability and experience."

On the 1st of September, the thunder rolls nearer and nearer, and he is directed to take charge of the defences of Washington.

On the 2nd of September; the storm bursts, and the recoil of the weak and wicked policy of not supporting McClellan before Richmond fills its authors with dismay, and they turn to that persecuted General as the only man who can save the Capital from capture and themselves from everlasting infamy.

He saves them! Are they grateful? *We shall see.*

AMOS KENDALL.

September 19, 1864.

LETTER XVI.

EFFECT OF M'CLELLAN'S RESTORATION—HIS DELAYS—INTERFERENCES—GENERAL HALLECK'S HONOR—M'CLELLAN LEARNS LEE'S DESIGNS—ADVANCES RAPIDLY—VICTORIES AT CHAMPION'S

GAP, SOUTH MOUNTAIN AND ANTIETAM—HARPER'S FERRY—RELATIVE LOSSES—LINCOLN SAVED RICHMOND—M'CLELLAN SAVED WASHINGTON.

To all Just and Patriotic Men:

Our last letter closed with the reinstatement of General McClellan on the 21 September, 1862, in the command of his old army increased by the routed remains of the army of Virginia.

On that very day he issued orders directing the retreating corps and detachments what positions to take up, so as most effectually to check the advance of the enemy. The effect upon the army was electric. "How did you feel," said we to a soldier "when your old commander was restored to you?" "We felt," said he, "like one who had lost all he had in the world and it was all suddenly restored to him when he least expected it." Rapidly the demoralized portions of the army recovered their organization and confidence and were prepared for battle and victory.

The rebels did not pursue the retreating Union army towards Washington, and on the 3d of September, had disappeared from the front on the Virginia side. It became evident, that their design was to cross the Potomac, but at what points or whether for the purpose of attacking Baltimore or Washington on the Maryland side or invading Pennsylvania, could not for some days be ascertained. General McClellan, with the main body of his army crossed into Maryland, and cautiously advanced on several parallel roads keeping the Potomac on his left in such manner as to cover Washington until the rebel plans should be developed. As on former occasions, the authorities at Washington, still trembling for their own safety, were constantly thrusting upon him their apprehensions and advice. On the 9th September, General Halleck telegraphed him as follows:

"Until we can get better advices about the numbers of the enemy at Drainesville, I think we must be very cautious about stripping too much the forts on the Virginia side. It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac. Think of this."

On the 13th he telegraphed: "Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in thus uncovering the Capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy will send a small column towards Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Wash-

ington with the forces south of the Potomac and those he may cross over."

On the 14th Gen. Halleck telegraphed: "Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear."

On the 16th Gen. Halleck telegraphed: "I think, however, that you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front, has crossed the river. I fear now more than ever that they will recross at Harper's Ferry, or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. This has appeared to me to be a part of their plan and hence my anxiety on the subject."

The general reader will remember that General Halleck testified before a certain military commission that General McClellan, when ordered to repel the invasion of Maryland, had marched with his army on an average only six miles a day, and a clamor was raised against him because he was so slow. But General Halleck did not state that it would not have been prudent for him to have advanced faster until he knew the enemy's objects, and that, slow as his progress was, it was too fast for the nerves of the General in chief, who constantly imagined he saw the rebel army evading McClellan and falling upon Washington. If these messages meant anything, they meant that General McClellan was proceeding *too fast*—was leaving Washington too far behind him—so far that the rebels might slip in and capture the City with its worthy occupants. Yet, the General in chief afterwards had the *honor*, without a word of explanation, to state that Gen. McClellan's army marched on an average only six miles a day, creating the impression that he was criminally slow in advancing upon the enemy?

On the 13th of September, a general order of the rebel commander, dated the 9th, fell into the hands of General McClellan, which conclusively showed, that his immediate object was not an attack on Washington, but the invasion of Pennsylvania through the Cumberland valley. From that moment his advance was rapid enough to satisfy the most eager for battle. All portions of the army were ordered to advance with the utmost expedition. On the next day, the 14th of September, occurred the battles and victories of South Mountain and Crampton's Gap. It was night before the battle of South Mountain was ended. The next morning the enemy

were rapidly pursued, 250 prisoners and two guns taken in Boonsboro, many stragglers picked up, and night found the opposing armies confronting each other at Antietam creek. The 16th was spent in reconnoitering and taking positions until near night, when a sharp fight occurred between advanced parties. On the 17th was fought the bloody battle of Antietam, at the close of which, though the rebels lost some of their positions they still maintained a defiant front. The 18th was spent in burying the dead, taking care of the wounded, reorganizing the shattered columns and preparing for a renewal of the battle the next morning; but the enemy retreated in the night, conceding the victory to the Union arms. Thus was Washington relieved from apprehensions, and Pennsylvania saved from invasion.

After all this, a cruel and unjust attempt was made by the General-in-Chief to hold Gen. McClellan responsible for the surrender of Harper's Ferry, with nine thousand men, on the morning of the 15th September. Before he left Washington, Gen. McClellan had recommended that this force should be withdrawn and sent into the Cumberland valley for its defence; but no attention was paid to his recommendation. On the 10th he telegraphed as follows to Gen. Halleck: "Col. Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, as I understand. He can do nothing where he is, but could be of great service if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered to join me by the most practicable route."

The General-in-Chief replied: "There is no way for Col. Miles to join you at present; his only chance is to defend his works until you can open communication with him."

Although communication was cut off from below, there was then no obstacle to his retirement through Williamsport and Hagerstown.

Harper's Ferry was not then under Gen. McClellan's command, and he could do no more than open communication with it, and thus, if possible, save the garrison. For this purpose was the advance through Crampton's Gap; and the object would have been accomplished, but for the unnecessary and cowardly surrender of that post on the 15th.

The Union army at the battle of Antietam numbered 87,164 men. It lost in killed, wounded, and missing, 12,469.

The rebel army numbered about 97,000 men. Their loss, though never definitely ascertained, undoubtedly exceeded that of the Union

army. The entire killed of the latter army were 2010. Of the rebel army, 2700 dead were counted and buried on the field, and many more were buried by their companions. The Union wounded were 9,416. If the rebel wounded bore the same proportion to their killed, they must have amounted to about 13,000. The missing of the Union army were 1,043, and they took about 6,000 prisoners. Supposing these to be all the missing on the rebel side, their missing exceeded those of the Union army by about 5,000. These elements conclusively show that the rebel loss in that terrible battle largely exceeded 20,000 men.

Not a single gun or color was lost by the Union army in the battles of Crampton's Gap, South Mountain and Antietam, while they took from the rebels 13 guns, thirty-nine colors and upwards of fifteen thousand small arms.

And yet the Lincoln journals assert that Gen. McClellan never won a victory!

The results of the military operations of 1862, thus far under Commander-in-Chief Lincoln and Major General McClellan, may be summed up as follows:

LINCOLN SAVED RICHMOND

AND

McCLELLAN SAVED WASHINGTON.

For saving Richmond, Lincoln is praised, flattered and proposed for re-election to the Presidency!

For saving Washington, McClellan is traduced, driven from the service of his country, and even stigmatized as the accomplice and leader of traitors!!

God is just. Are the people? November will answer.

AMOS KENDALL.

September 24, 1864.

LETTER XVII.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY AFTER ANTIETAM—NO RECOGNITION OF THE VICTORY—FAULT FINDING—ORDER OF 6th OCTOBER—ITS NATURE AND OBJECT—ARMY CROSSES THE POTOMAC—IS IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY—M'CLELLAN DISMISSED—THE PRETEXTS—QUESTIONS—THE REAL CAUSE HIS FIDELITY—PROOF THAT IT HAD BEEN LONG MEDITATED—HIS SUBMISSION TO LAWFUL AUTHORITY—ORDER ABOUT RESIGNATIONS.

To all just and patriotic men:

After the battle of Antietam the army was not in a condition to follow the rebel army into Virginia. It was made up of the troops

composing the old army of the Potomac, and those composing the army of Virginia. The former had been rapidly hurried from place to place to meet the emergency, and the latter demoralized by defeat. Both, in their marches and battles had worn out their shoes and clothing, and had lost or left behind a large portion of their tents and knapsacks. Nor was it otherwise prudent to follow the retreating rebels. The means of transportation by railroad had been deranged by the military operations, the army had no adequate means of transportation by wagons, the only resource beyond the Potomac, and so large an army with one of equal size in its front, could not procure subsistence in the Valley of Virginia. The rebel army, retreating upon its supplies, incurred no inconvenience from those sources. There was, therefore much hazard of ultimate defeat should the Union army, under these circumstances, attempt a pursuit.

The military situation did not at that time require or justify the incurring of any hazard. The immediate object of the campaign had been accomplished, Washington was rescued from danger, Pennsylvania saved from invasion, and Maryland cleared of the enemy.

It was, therefore, the duty of General McClellan to run no risks, to desist from pursuit until he could open his lines of communication, obtain the means of transportation, rest and refit his exhausted and destitute men, and then advance again upon the enemy with a well supplied and reinvigorated army. With these views, after some skirmishing at and on the other side of the Potomac, Gen. McClellan betook himself to re-organizing his army and preparing it to command further victories.

As on former occasions, the victory of Antietam was echoed by no cheering words of thanks and congratulation from the General-in-chief or the War Department, to the army or its commander. On the contrary, having used the "ability and experience" of General McClellan to rescue them from danger, they recurred to their former habit of querulousness and faultfinding, seeming to think, that however destitute of food, clothing and shelter the soldiers might be, Gen. McClellan had but to order an advance and the rebellion would be annihilated.

On the 6th of October was issued to Gen. McClellan one of those ridiculous orders, implying that the authorities at Washington

know better what is practicable and proper than Generals in command a hundred or hundreds of miles distant, and have but to say the word and all difficulties vanish, armies can move without food, clothing and tents, wagons or horses, and impossibilities become possible as by the fiat of Omnipotence. This order came from the General-in-Chief and contained the following passages, viz :

"The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. * * * I am directed to add, that the Secretary of War and General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions."

Every such order given by the President to a distant commander, is in the nature of things conditional. Had the army been supplied with every necessary article, it could not have stepped across the Potomac in an hour, or a day, or two days, and the time of its movement must necessarily have been fixed, not by the order alone, but by the order in connection with the state of preparation when it was received. This principle was recognized by the following clause in the order itself :

"He [the President] is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible" not *as soon as you get this order, but as soon as it can possibly be gotten ready*. When, on the 21st of October, Gen. McClellan stated the condition of his army and asked whether the President "desired him to advance upon the enemy at once," the General-in-chief replied: "the President has no change to make in his order of the 6th inst. If you have not been and are not now in a condition to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability. *The President does not expect impossibilities.*" It does not appear, that Gen. McClellan was called on, before his dismissal, to show his "want of ability;" but in his Report he does show, that he could not have moved sooner than he did, consistently with justice to his men and the efficiency of his army.

The Washington authorities well know that prompt obedience to this order, would, under existing circumstances, have exposed the army to almost certain defeat, and it is difficult to resist the inference that the chief motive in issuing it, was to make a pretext for charging Gen. McClellan with disobedience of orders.

Though energetic efforts had been made to supply the troops, many of them were "in want of shoes, blankets and many other indispensable articles of clothing." Efforts to sup-

ply them were redoubled; but owing to ill-management on the Railroads they were most provokingly delayed. The cavalry attached to the army, had been much reduced, and what was left, was almost annihilated in their attempt to capture the rebel Stuart in his raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania on the 10th of October.

Although the army had not one fourth of its due allowance of cavalry and some of the divisions had not received their supplies, they commenced crossing the Potomac at Berlin on the 25th of October, and between that date and the 2d of November the whole army crossed at that place and at Harper's Ferry. The army advanced rapidly with some skirmishing by cavalry until the 7th of November when the main body was massed near Warrenton and the advance was within six miles of Culpepper Court House. Of the rebel army, Jackson with his corps and some other troops, were west of the Blue Ridge, Longstreet at Culpepper Court-House, and Lee beyond the Rappahannock. It was Gen. McClellan's design to advance immediately upon Longstreet, and if possible defeat the rebel force east of the Blue Ridge before it could be reinforced by Jackson's command.

But it was not intended by the authorities at Washington that General McClellan should win another victory. The President had gone over to "the Greeley faction," and issued his preliminary emancipation proclamation. The same "pressure" which had forced that measure upon him, had long demanded that General McClellan should not be allowed to remain at the head of that army. He was too loyal to the Union and the Constitution. Of course, it would not do to disclose the true reason, and a resort must be had to pretext. Now, the real object of the order of the 6th of October becomes apparent. In reply to certain inquiries of the Secretary of War, the General-in-chief, in a communication dated the 28th of October, *three days after the army had commenced its movement*, alluded to that order in the following words, viz :

"On the 6th of October he [Gen. McClellan] was peremptorily ordered to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him South."

"Your army *must* move now while the roads are good." And he attempts to show that Gen. McClellan's complaints of want of supplies were unfounded. He calls the order "per-

empty" and emphasizes the word "must" in his extract. "Your army *must* move now," &c.

This order was dated October 6th. General McClellan received his discharge on the night of the 7th November. Notwithstanding the alleged disobedience of orders, he was allowed to remain in command upwards of four weeks after it was given. Several questions are suggested by these facts.

If McClellan was dismissed for disobedience of that order, *why was he not discharged one, two or three weeks sooner?*

Why was he not dismissed when General Halleck made his report on the 28th of October?

Why was he dismissed *after he had obeyed one branch of the order by crossing the Potomac?*

Why was he dismissed *when he was in the act of obeying the other branch of the order by giving battle to the enemy?*

Why was the hunting up of pretexts delayed until he was *in the act of obeying the order?*

We have no doubt, this step was determined upon before the order was issued. Its real cause was identical with that of the emancipation proclamation. The men who forced the President upon the abolition platform, required him to dismiss General McClellan. Though long contemplated, the reason it was not done sooner, was that elections were to be held in Ohio and Pennsylvania on the 14th of October, and in New York on the 4th of November, and it was feared that the dismissal of so popular a General would affect them disastrously for the Administration!

The truth is his removal was contemplated before he left the Peninsula, and that it was only as a matter of necessity that he was allowed to command during the Maryland campaign. Conclusive proof of this assertion is found in the testimony of Gen. Burnside, a witness the Lincolnites cannot impeach, given before the committee of Congress, from which the following passages are extracts, viz:

"After getting over my surprise, the shock, &c.," [on receiving the order to take command of the army,] "I told Gen. Buckingham * * that I did not want the command; that it had been offered to me twice before, and I did not feel that I could take it. * * I told them" [his staff officers in consultation] "that I was not competent to command such a large army as this. I had said the same thing over and over again to the President and Secretary of War, and also that if matters could be satisfactorily arranged

with Gen. McClellan, I thought he could command the Army of the Potomac better than any other General in it. * *

"There had been some conversation in regard to the removal of Gen. McClellan when he was bringing away his army from before Richmond. The first of these conversations with the President and Secretary of War occurred at that time. And then, after Gen. McClellan got back to Washington, and before the commencement of the Maryland campaign, there was another conversation of the same kind; and on both of those occasions I expressed to the President the opinion that there was not any one who could do as much with that army as Gen. McClellan could."

This testimony establishes the following facts, viz:

1. That having forced Gen. McClellan to withdraw from Richmond, by depriving him of McDowell's corps, the authorities at Washington at that time offered the command of the army to Gen. Burnside.

2. That they did not intend that General McClellan should command the army in the Maryland campaign, and that he was allowed to command *only because Gen. Burnside declined that responsible position.*

3. That they finally gave a peremptory order to Gen. Burnside to take command of the army after he had "told them *over and over again*" that he was not competent to command so large an army, and that Gen. McClellan *could do more with it than any other man.*

4. And finally, that from a period in the peninsula campaign to General McClellan's dismissal in November, 1862, it was the steady purpose of the controlling authorities at Washington, *to drive him out of the military service, no matter what disasters it might entail upon the army or the country.*

Such a malignant and persistent persecution of an able, honest, brave and patriotic citizen soldier, for no other crime than inflexible devotion to the Constitution and the Union, has few if any precedents in history, and finds its parallels in works of fiction.

What would have been the fate of the malignants at Washington and of the city itself, had Burnside accepted the command of the army in the Maryland campaign, and anticipated at Antietam the disaster at Fredericksburg?

Had Gen. McClellan been a Cæsar or Napoleon, he might have led his devoted army to Washington and avenged himself upon his implacable enemies, who in their injustice to him, were sacrificing the army and the country; but like the faithful soldier and true pa-

triot, he submitted without a murmur to the decision of those who had a lawful right to control him, impressed upon his officers their duty to be true to his successor and their country, and gracefully retired to private life.

His enemies signalized their apprehensions of the effects which the causeless and wicked dismissal of their beloved General might have on the army, by an order announcing that no resignations of officers would be accepted, but that all who tendered them should be dismissed in disgrace!

In another letter, we propose to trace out briefly the consequences which followed from Gen. McClellan's dismissal.

AMOS KENDALL.

September 28, 1864.

LETTER XVIII.

EFFECTS OF M'CLELLAN'S DISMISSAL—BURNSIDE'S PLAN—GENERAL HALLECK'S VERACITY AND RESPONSIBILITY—GENERAL WOODBURY'S TESTIMONY—THE SLAUGHTER AT FREDERICKSBURG—ABRAHAM LINCOLN RESPONSIBLE—HOOKER IN COMMAND—THE SLAUGHTER AT CHANCELLOR VILLE—AT GETTYSBURG AND IN GRANT'S CAMPAIGN—ABRAHAM LINCOLN RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL—YET ASKS TO BE RE-ELECTED.

To all Just and Patriotic men :

We have already seen in the second disaster at Bull Run, the invasion of Maryland, the bloody battles at Crampton's Gap, South Mountain and Antietam, the sad consequences of President Lincoln's policy in failing to support General McClellan before Richmond, and withdrawing his army from the Peninsula. The melancholy duty now devolves upon us of developing the further disastrous consequences which followed his dismissal from the command.

Its first effect was to stop the march of the army, save the enemy from immediate attack and give time to concentrate and prepare. The complaint against McClellan was, that he did not move and attack the enemy; yet when he did move and was in the act of attacking the enemy, the President stopped the movement and saved the enemy from attack, as he had before saved Richmond from capture.

The army was now obliged to remain inactive until its new commander could make himself acquainted with its positions and details, and digest his plans for the future campaign.

McClellan's plan was, to attack the portion of the rebel army directly in his front, defeat

it before it could be reinforced, and then march down to the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, make Aquia Creek his base of supplies and advance by that line upon Richmond. Burnside in effect adopted the same plan, with the exception of the immediate attack upon the enemy. His plan was to march down at once to Falmouth opposite to Fredericksburg, cross the Rappahannock, and advance upon Richmond along the route of the railroad. This plan was acquiesced in by General Halleck and approved by the President. Its success depended on the rapidity of the movement and the means of promptly crossing the river at Fredericksburg. The army marched rapidly down to Falmouth; but when they reached that point, they found no means of crossing and were obliged to remain idle in their encampments until the rebels had time to concentrate their forces on the opposite side of the river and fortify the heights back of Fredericksburg. Here was a fatal blunder, and the question is, who is responsible for it?

The evidence before the Committee of Congress establishes the following facts:

Most of the pontoon bridges relied upon for crossing, were at Berlin and Harper's Ferry, where McClellan crossed upon the opening of the campaign.

On the 11th or 12th of November, Gen. Halleck in company with Gen. Meigs and Gen. Haupt, met Gen. Burnside at Warrenton to confer with him in relation to the future campaign. Burnside there disclosed to Gen. Halleck his plans, which the latter sanctioned, subject to the approval of the President. The pontoons were an essential portion of the arrangement, and Gen. Burnside understood, as he afterwards stated, that Gen. Halleck and his subordinates at Washington, were to have them at Falmouth as soon as the army could reach that place. They did not arrive, however, until the 24th or 25th day of November, seven or eight days after the arrival of the advance.

Gen. Halleck endeavored to exonerate himself for this delay before the Committee of Congress by alleging that Gen. Woodbury, who had charge of that branch of the service, was under Gen. Burnside's command. This allegation is rebutted by the following order addressed to Gen. Woodbury while the Generals were still in conference:

"WARRENTON, Nov. 12, 7.10 p. m.—"Call upon the chief quartermaster, Col. Rucker, to transport all your pontoons and bridge ma-

terials to Aquia Creek. Col. Belger has been ordered to charter and send one hundred barges to Alexandria.

(Signed)

H. W. HALLECK,
General in-Chief."

Gen. Meigs in his testimony gives the following history of this order:

* * * * "I remember that I wrote in pencil an order to Gen. Woodbury to call on the Quartermaster at Washington for transportation for his pontoons to Aquia Creek. * * * I handed this order to Gen. Halleck saying, Gen. Woodbury is an engineer; he is under your orders, not under mine; and it is not proper, therefore, for me to sign this order. If you think it right, I advise you to sign it. He signed and it was sent off to the telegraph office."

On the 23d of November, Gen. Halleck telegraphed to Gen. Burnside as follows:

"You are aware that I telegraphed from your quarters in Warrenton to Gen. Woodbury to send the pontoon trains to Aquia Creek. Immediately on my return, I saw him myself to urge them forward. He left for Aquia Creek with his brigade to report to you; he is there under your command. If there has been any unnecessary delay, call him to account. There has been no delay at these headquarters in ordering as you requested."

This evidence is certainly conclusive, that Gen. Woodbury was under Gen. Halleck's orders until he reported to Gen. Burnside at Aquia Creek. Yet Gen. Halleck testified before the committee of Congress that Gen. Woodbury, together with all the officers and their troops in and about Washington, was under the orders of Gen. Burnside!

After all, however, there does not appear to have been any unnecessary delay in forwarding the pontoons. The responsibility lies in another direction. *It was in suffering the army to move before it was possible for the pontoons to meet it at Falmouth.* Whose fault was that? It seems to have been taken for granted in the conference at Warrenton that the pontoons could be gotten to Falmouth as soon as the army could get there. Gen. Halleck states that on his return to Washington he saw Gen. Woodbury, with the view of hastening the pontoons.

Gen. Woodbury testified as follows before the committee of Congress. When the order of the 12th November was received, he says:

"At that time there were only twelve serviceable pontoons in Washington, all the others being in bridges at Harper's Ferry and Berlin, about six miles below Harper's Ferry."

* * * * *

' Gen. Halleck's order to me of the 13th

[received the 13th, dated 7 10 P. M. the 12th] made it apparent that the army was preparing to march to Fredericksburg. As to the time when the movement would be made, I never received any information. Fearing, however, that the movement would be precipitate, I went to Gen. Halleck's office, and urged him to delay the movement some five days, in order that the necessary preparations might be made to insure success. To this he replied, that he would do nothing to delay for an instant the advance of the army upon Richmond. I rejoined that my suggestion was not intended to cause delay, but rather to prevent it."

Gen. Halleck must have learnt in his conversations with Mr. Woodbury, if he did not know it before, that most of the pontoons were at Harper's Ferry and Berlin, and that it was impossible for them to be conveyed to Falmouth in time to meet the army. It is astounding that a general who had the triumph of the Union arms at heart should not, without the suggestions of a subordinate, have taken care so to regulate the movement of the army, as well as the pontoons (having absolute control of both) that they should meet at Falmouth. His answer to Gen. Woodbury, when reminded of the danger, shows a most surprising recklessness, and justifies the country in holding him primarily responsible for the consequences.

A portion of the army reached Falmouth on the 17th of November. The pontoons arrived on the 24th and 25th. Thus were the rebels allowed over a week to concentrate and fortify on the heights back of Fredericksburg. On the 11th day of December the army crossed the Rappahannock, and on the 13th attacked the rebels, and the consequence was a bloody repulse in which over ten thousand brave men of the army of the Potomac were killed or wounded.

Who is responsible for the lives lost and the wounds inflicted on this bloody day? We answer, *Abraham Lincoln, a candidate for the Presidency*, who took from the army a competent commander in the person of George B. McClellan and gave it to an incompetent one in the person of A. E. Burnside, and retained in the service a General-in-Chief whose criminal negligence prepared the way for the disaster.

What next? Gen. Burnside soon proved himself wholly incompetent to gain the confidence or insure the subordination of the officers of the army under his command. To such a pitch were their attempts, open and secret, to thwart his plan, carried, that he

made out an order dismissing or suspending about twenty of them from the service, and at the head of the list was General Hooker! General Burnside waited on the President and presented this order and his resignation, insisting that he should approve the one or accept the other. The President did neither, but relieved Burnside from the command and put Hooker in his place. Yes, the President, instead of dismissing Hooker, the very head man on Burnside's mutinous list, rewards him with the command of the army!

Now if Hooker was guilty of Burnside's charges, *he was palpably unfit for the command*, and if Burnside's charges were false, *he ought to have been dismissed for making them*. Yet these two Generals *have been pets of the Administration ever since!*

What next? Hooker led the army across the Rappahannock, and at Chancellorville some ten thousand more of brave Northern men are laid low in death or with ghastly wounds. Who was responsible for that terrible disaster? *Abraham Lincoln*, who, in substituting Hooker for Burnside, exchanged an incompetent commander for one still more incompetent. *Yet he asks the people to re elect him President!*

What next? McClellan's noble army which he had led into Virginia full of confidence and enthusiasm, was now so far weakened by bad management and defeat, that the rebel chiefs considered their Capital entirely safe and turned their faces towards the North. They passed through Maryland and entered Pennsylvania. They were pursued by the army of the Potomac under General Meade, who had replaced General Hooker. The armies met at Gettysburg, and although the Union army was victorious, the blood of some fifteen thousand slaughtered and mangled Northern men cried from the ground against the administration whose injustice and weak and wicked policy had produced the rebel invasion.

What next? As at Antietam, the Union army was not in a condition to follow up the victory, and the rebels retreated into Virginia, followed leisurely by the army of the Potomac. That army, after fighting three terrible battles, marching hundreds of miles and losing by sickness and battle more than fifty thousand men, found itself in the fall of 1863, virtually in the position it occupied when General McClellan was dismissed from the command.

For this waste of life and time and millions upon millions of public treasure, *Abraham Lincoln* is responsible; and yet he asks to be re-elected President of the United States!

What next? The fourth year of the war and also of Mr. Lincoln's term of office, was at hand. He had by his savage policy united the people of the South and driven them to desperation, and at the same time divided the North; but so far, had done nothing towards securing his re-election. It was necessary that something should be done in that direction, or the power which had been so ineffectually and disastrously wielded, would depart from the house of Abraham in the next election. General Grant was, therefore, called from the West, made General in Chief and clothed with all the military power of the Government with especial reference to the capture of Richmond. He fights the battles of the Wilderness, of Spottsylvania Court House, is repulsed before Richmond without getting as near to the city as McClellan did in 1862, and finally makes James river his base, as McClellan did, and when reinforced attacked Petersburg as McClellan proposed to do. The march of Grant has been attended by an amount of slaughter of northern men unequalled in modern war. McClellan when at Harrison's Landing, asked but thirty, or at most fifty thousand men, to enable him to take Richmond. Grant, *after losing nearly as many men as there were in McClellan's whole army* and having received sixty to seventy thousand in reinforcements, recently asked for a hundred thousand more to enable him to take Richmond!

And who is responsible for this awful loss of Northern lives? *Abraham Lincoln* who saved Richmond from capture by withdrawing McDowell's corps in 1862, removed Mr. McClellan from the command, entrusted the army to incompetent hands, and reduced the Southern people to desperation, fighting now, not so much for independence as for their property and their rights as men.

And notwithstanding this awful sacrifice of Northern lives by gross if not wilful mismanagement, *Abraham Lincoln* asks the people to re elect him President of the United States! Will they elect him? Or will they prefer the able General, the true patriot and inflexible friend of the Union and the Constitution, who saved Washington from capture in 1862, and would long since have suppressed the rebellion and put an end to this awful bloodshed, if he had been permitted.

AMOS KENDALL.

October 4, 1864.

LETTER XIX.

M'CLELLAN AND THE PLATFORM FOR THE UNION AT EVERY HAZARD—AN ACT OF GOD ONLY CAN MAKE PENDLETON PRESIDENT—A CHOICE OF EVILS—THE LINCOLN AND M'CLELLAN POLITICAL STOCK—LINCOLN & CO. THE BIG BROKERS—THE WAR FOR THE UNION MADE A WAR FOR PARTY POWER—THE ACCOUNT STATED—LOSS OF TERRITORY—REBELLION NOT SO NEAR SUPPRESSION AS IN 1862—CORRUPT BARGAINING—ATTEMPT TO BUY OFF M'CLELLAN—DEPOSITION OF THE BLAIRS—THE MOTIVE—THEIR COURSE AND MOTIVE—COURSE AND MOTIVES OF CHASE WADE, AND WINTER DAVIS—THE GREATEST DANGER OF THE UNION FROM LINCOLN & CO.

To all just and patriotic men :

The Lincolnites have but three sources of hope for success in the approaching Presidential election. One is an attempt to make the people believe that Gen. McClellan, if elected, will sacrifice the Union for the sake of peace. Another is, that a disgusted and indignant people may be reconciled to them by military victories, now and hereafter to be achieved. The third is corrupt bargaining. Let us examine these three grounds of hope on their part.

M'CLELLAN AND THE PLATFORM.

That Gen. McClellan is sincere and truthful, no intelligent man can honestly doubt. From the outbreak of the rebellion to the present day, in various forms, and finally in his letter of acceptance, he has uniformly declared that the *Union must be preserved at EVERY HAZARD*. But the Chicago platform, it is said, is a peace and disunion platform. To make that out, they tear out the first plank, which proclaims unswerving devotion to the Union, and hack, and twist, and warp the second, which favors an armistice and national convention, so as to make it seem what it is not.

Taken together the united planks clearly mean, *peace with Union* and not peace with separation. Thus General McClellan reads it. No man is fool enough to believe, that there can be an armistice or National Convention without the concurrence of both parties. There cannot be peace on one side and war on the other. An armistice as well as a treaty, must depend on mutual assent to certain conditions. Upon the principles of the Chicago Platform and General McClellan's acceptance, we must have an indication that the rebels are willing to return to their allegiance as *an indispensable condition of any armistice*. And if an armistice and peace can be had on such terms, who but a mad fanatic or

ferocious savage who delights in human butchery, will object to it.

But Mr. Pendleton is represented to be in favor of peace with separation. He has his peculiar notions; but no man more ardently desires peace with Union than he does. But nobody is asked or expected to vote for Mr. Pendleton as President. He is a candidate for Vice President, or President of the Senate, an office totally destitute of civil or military power. No act of the people can make him President within his term of four years; he can only reach that dignity *by the act of God*. And if God, either in mercy or in anger, shall remove Gen. McClellan and make Mr. Pendleton President, ought not such *humble* worshippers as the Beechers, the Cheevers, and the thousands of New England clergymen who now claim to know and proclaim His will, to be satisfied, that, on the whole, it is best for them and their country that Mr. Pendleton should be President? To rid the country of the Lincoln tyranny and open the door to peace and Union on the basis of the Constitution, we, at least, though like McClellan, in favor of maintaining the Union at all hazards, are willing to support the Chicago nominations and leave future dispositions to our country's God. But, it is said, the peace men, the sympathizers, the copperheads, will all vote for McClellan, and if he be not one of them, this is very "mysterious"—VERY! These wise ones seem never to have heard of such a thing as "*a choice of evils*." Can they tell us on what principle it is, that Greeley, and Garrison and Beecher, and all the ultra abolition leaders who have denounced Lincoln as a faithless imbecile, now support him? Can they tell us why Ben Wade and Winter Davis, who published charges against him deserving of impeachment, now propose to reward him by re-election? When men who have charged Gen. McClellan with such crimes, turn out upon the stump to advocate his election, we shall think there is really something "mysterious" in it—something more than "*a choice of evils*"—some corrupt bargain that they shall be paid for it—or some equally corrupt understanding, that the man they serve shall exclude from public employment some of his own political friends—such as the Blair's for instance!

LINCOLN'S MILITARY CAPITAL.

The Lincolnites now and then taunt the Democrats with the assertion that the McClell-

lan political stock rises as the country sinks, and sinks as the country rises; in other words, that the defeat of the Union armies increases McClellan's prospect of election and their victories diminish it—what then? Who control the elements which operate upon *this stock market*? Not, surely, McClellan and his friends. The big brokers in this market are *Abraham Lincoln & Co.*, who, in the absolute control of the army and navy, have the means of tossing up their own stock by victory or pulling it down by defeat.

They represent both the Bulls and the Bears. If any one wishes to know the means by which they are now operating to raise the Lincoln stock, let him read the Stanton Dix bulletins, concealing or glossing over disasters and magnifying insignificant affairs into important victories. But does it become the modest mouths of the Lincolnites when they manage affairs so badly as to depress their own stock, to complain because an outsider chances to profit by it, when he cannot help it if he would? The military campaigns of this year have unquestionably been planned more with a view of saving the party in power than of saving the Union. Let us briefly review them:

An army was sent into Florida for the notorious purpose of organizing a sham State government, and securing three votes for Abraham Lincoln's re-election. They were shamefully defeated and driven back in disgrace. *Put that to the Lincoln account.*

A sham State government was gotten up in that portion of Louisiana, perhaps one-fifth, held by the federal forces, and an army was sent to clear the western part of the state of armed rebels, that several votes might, with some show of decency, be cast for Abraham Lincoln. That army was also defeated and driven back. *Put that to the Lincoln account.*

Arkansas was considered a conquered state, a sham government was gotten up there also, a federal force was there to sustain it, and votes from that state were confidently expected for Lincoln's re-election. But the federal force there has also been defeated, the state over-run by the rebels, and nothing is left to the government but a few isolated posts. *Put that to the Lincoln account.*

Look at Missouri: That State was clear of rebel forces in any organized bodies at the commencement of the year. Now, about one-half of it is over-run by rebel armies, its capital is threatened, and St. Louis itself is in

danger of attack. *Put that to the Lincoln account.*

A considerable portion of Texas, on the Rio Grande, had been occupied by the Union forces, and the rebel commerce through Mexico cut off. The State has now been entirely abandoned with the exception of an insignificant garrison at Point Isabel. *Put that to the Lincoln account.*

The destruction of hundreds of merchant vessels by rebel privateers, the failure at Charleston, the raid upon Maryland and the defences of Washington, and the burning of Chambersburg. *Put them all to the Lincoln account.*

The killing and maiming in battle and by sickness of a hundred thousand Northern men in the hitherto ineffectual attempt to take Richmond, which Mr. Lincoln saved from capture in 1862, and the call for a hundred thousand more—*write that down in LETTERS OF BLOOD.*

And what has Lincoln to set off against this catalogue of losses and disasters?

Sherman's brilliant campaign, a miracle of able management on his part, the results of which, whether good or evil, depend on his ability to maintain his communications over a land line of five hundred miles, beset by guerrillas. The capture by Farragut of a few rebel craft and the forts at the mouth of Mobile—a brilliant exploit, but little conducive to the suppression of the rebellion. The sinking of the pirate Alabama. Sheridan's victories in the valley of the Shenandoah, ably planned and bravely won. And these wind-falls of success in the midst of general disaster, have been echoed and re-echoed by hundreds of cannon with their hundred rounds and partisan rejoicing, not so much because they portended the suppression of the rebellion, AS BECAUSE THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO AID IN MR. LINCOLN'S RE-ELECTION. And what the country has now to fear is, the slaughter of tens of thousands of its brave soldiers in desperate enterprises undertaken for the mere purpose of making capital for Lincoln's re-election. Territorially, what has the Administration gained and lost in this year's campaign?

They have gained in Georgia and Virginia only so much as can be guarded by the cavalry and protected by the guns of Sherman, Grant and Sheridan. They have gained nothing in Florida or Louisiana. They have lost what they held of Texas, nearly the whole of Arkansas, and a large portion of Missouri. They

have lost in territory more than twenty times as much as they have gained. But the Administration is not to be judged by this year's campaign alone. We have had almost four years of war. Of men and money, the Administration has had all it asked for. Where are the two million of men they have called into the field? What have they done with the two thousand million of dollars they have expended? Is the rebellion as near suppression now as it apparently was when Lincoln saved Richmond from capture in 1862?

CORRUPTION.

The third ground of hope for Mr. Lincoln's re-election consists in corrupt bargaining for the purpose of buying off opposition as well as of purchasing support. This game has even been attempted upon General McClellan. Some weeks ago, a correspondent of a New York paper in this city, gave a detailed statement of an offer made to that General of an important command in the army on condition that he would not allow his name to be used as a candidate for the Presidency. Though details were given as well as the name of the agent, the statement did not make much impression because there was no evidence identifying the President with the transaction. Such evidence has now come to light. In a publication recently made by General Naglee, of Pennsylvania, he makes the following statement in relation to General McClellan:—

"So far as the objections to his military qualifications are concerned we have only to remind you that within the last sixty days a confidential friend of the President was sent to offer him one of the most important commands of the army. But this proposition was coupled with the most dishonorable condition that he should decline to be a candidate for the Presidency. General McClellan restrained his indignation, and replied to the bearer of the message, 'Go back to Washington, and say to the President for me, that when I receive my official written orders he shall have my answer.'"

But the conclusive evidence fixing the responsibility directly upon the President, is found in a declaration of the late Postmaster General, Hon. Montgomery Blair, made while recently delivering a speech in New York. In speaking of General McClellan, he used these words:

"One, whom to the last, I believed to be true to the cause in which his country was embarked, and I may add, whom the President held to be patriotic, and had concerted with Gen. Grant to bring again into the field as his adjunct

if he turned his back on the proposals of the peace junta at Chicago."

There then was a direct attempt to buy off the Democratic candidate by offering him a high command in the army, involving an admission that the pretexts upon which he was dismissed were without foundation, and that all the imputations upon General McClellan's ability and loyalty are wilfully and atrociously false. There is no escape from this conclusion upon any other hypothesis, unless it be that Mr. Lincoln, knowing General McClellan's incapacity and disloyalty, was still willing for political ends, to entrust him with a high command in the Union army. Take which horn of the dilemma you please, ye parasites of power and revilers of McClellan. Your negro Moses either considers all your imputations upon that able and pure man, libelous and false, or, to aid him in retaining power, he is willing to place a traitorous imbecile in command of our armies. It is amazing that Mr. Lincoln should dare to make such a proposition to such a man as General McClellan. It proves only the depth of his own depravity and is suggestive of the means by which some of his worst enemies have become his most zealous supporters.

The two Blairs, Postmaster General and Brigadier General, have recently been displaced from public station of profit and honor. Simultaneously Chase, Winter Davis, Ben Wade and all that class of radicals who had abused Lincoln for manifold usurpations and derelictions of duty, and hated the Blairs because there was a glow-worm's show of conservatism in them, took the field for Lincoln! What was the inducement? *Did they bargain their support on the condition that he should part with his friends, the Blairs?* Is that the "relief" meant by the President when he asked the late Postmaster General to resign? It looks like it. And why do the Blairs, after being told their public services are no longer wanted, still cling to Lincoln's skirts and render him *personal* and *political* service? Is there a bargain, that after the election they shall be re-instated or rewarded by foreign missions, or other high stations at home?

Let those who can, account on other principles for these anomalous combinations!

A PROPHECIC WARNING.

Our federal Union is in more danger this day from Abraham Lincoln and the unprincipled and fanatical faction to whom he has surrendered himself, soul and body, than from

all other causes combined. Chase, Greeley and their co-laborers were originally in favor of giving up the Union without an effort to maintain it by force. After the war had lasted about two years, Mr. Greeley declared in the *New York Tribune*, that if it could not be finished in three months more of earnest fighting, "let us bow to our destiny and make the best attainable peace."

Many other declarations of similar import were made by him in the winter of 1862-1863. The war was not finished within three months, and is still raging at the end of seventeen months, with no prospect of its speedy close. There cannot be a doubt that, notwithstanding the ferocious unionism of Greeley and men of his stamp, they are this day in their hearts in favor of "the best attainable peace"—peace with disunion. Their "unconditional unionism" is a mask to enable them

to retain power, and when they have succeeded they will cast it off and openly join the traitors to break up the Union, now and forever.

Mr. Lincoln has shown himself to be a mere tool in their hands, and hereafter will be more subservient than ever, being dependent on them for his re-election. Of these hypocrites who adopt the negro garb, that under its cover they may stab their country, will Mr. Lincoln's cabinet and his advisers be composed, and then will their secret purpose stand confessed before a betrayed people and an astonished world. It is the solemn conviction of the writer of these articles that the Union, the Constitution, and republican government, in our distracted country, can be preserved only by the election to the Presidency of George B. McClellan.

AMOS KENDALL.

October 8th, 1864.

POSTSCRIPT.

Let those who think the war near its close read the following, and ponder on the savage order of General Grant:

A letter from the valley to the *New York Herald* says:

On Thursday, September 29th, General Custer's and Merritt's divisions were sent up the valley to destroy, according to the following order:

"Headquarters, &c.—Do all the damage you can to the railroads and crops. Carry off stock of all descriptions and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If the war is to last another year, let the Shenandoah valley remain a barren waste. U. S. GRANT."

REMARKS.

If Gen. Grant believed the war near its close, or even did he expect soon to take Richmond, he would not have issued such an order. In that event, the rebel army, if not destroyed, must abandon Virginia, and there would be no motive for making the Shenandoah Valley "a barren waste." Such an

order, therefore, is conclusive that Gen. Grant does not expect a speedy termination of the war, even in Virginia.

But what shall we say of this mode of warfare? The writer who communicates this order says, that on the 29th ult., they destroyed "enough wheat to subsist the whole rebel army for a year to come, besides collecting fifteen hundred head of cattle and about three thousand sheep," and he adds that "on Friday the 30th, the destruction and collection operations were continued." This was not public property, but the property of farmers and others living in the Valley, constituting the means of subsistence for the old men, women and children during the coming winter. Does General Grant think the young men can be more easily conquered by starving their families?

But we forbear: "Sympathy" even for helpless and starving women and children may be counted a crime in this *Christian land*.



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